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I. INTRODUCTION
In a predecessor symposium on the topic of ecosystem services, 2 several distinguished scholars suggested that the major
“failing” of contemporary environmental law is its failure to protect
1.
Steven M. Goldstein Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. I
would like to thank Professors Robin Kundis Craig, Jon Klick, Kenneth Kristl, Dan Markel,
Joel Mintz, Benjamin Priester and J.B. Ruhl, and several EPA officials, including Beth
Cavalier and, Melissa Raack of the Special Litigation and Project Division at the EPA Office
of Enforcement and Compliance Assistance, and Jonathan Libber, the BEN Coordinator at
EPA OECA, for their helpful comments on drafts of this article. Ms. Cavalier and Ms.
Raack were quite helpful concerning aspects of EPA’s SEPs program; Mr. Libber provided
helpful information on EPA’s penalty calculation methodologies. None of the commenters,
or EPA as an organization, necessarily endorses the contents of the article and the agency
officials’ comments should not be taken to constitute such an endorsement. I am solely
responsible for the contents of the article. Please direct any comments to me at
dmarkell@law.fsu.edu.
2.
Symposium, Ecosystem Services, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309 (2001).
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ecosystems and the services they provide. 3 Their rationale was
two-fold. First, ecosystems and the services they provide are of
central importance to human and other existence; yet, second, environmental governance has traditionally given short shrift to the
protection of such ecosystems and services. Thus, protection of
ecosystems and the services they provide is a significant environmental priority that has not engendered a meaningful or effective
regulatory response.
The importance of ecosystems and the services they provide
does not seem to be in dispute. A burgeoning literature explains
that ecosystems provide conditions and processes that are necessary to sustain human life. 4 These processes include purifying the
air we breathe and the water we drink, recycling waste, replenishing soil nutrients, maintaining biodiversity, regulating climate,
flood and pest control, and pollination. 5 Jim Salzman points out in
a recent article that, for example, “[o]ne cannot begin to understand flood control . . . without realizing the impact that widespread wetland destruction has had on the ecosystem service of
water retention . . . .” 6 This example is particularly salient in light
of the enormous damage that Hurricane Katrina wrought. Several
studies have suggested that past destruction of wetlands contributed significantly to the devastation from Hurricane Katrina because the loss of these wetlands reduced the capacity of the natural environment to retain the water unleashed during the storm. 7
Other examples abound of the services that different types of eco3.
James Salzman, Barton H. Thompson, Jr. & Gretchen C. Daily, Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 310 (2001) (claiming that “the single greatest failing of modern environmental law and its greatest challenge
today [is] the inadequate protection of ecosystems and the services they provide.”). The
purported failings of environmental law are legion; no doubt others would have their own
choice for greatest flaw. See e.g., David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a “Reinvented” State, Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality,
24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Deterrence-Based Enforcement] (summarizing
various calls for reform).
4.
See e.g., Gretchen C. Daily, Introduction: What Are Ecosystem Services?, in NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 1, 3-4 (Gretchen C.
Daily ed., 1997); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: TOWARD
BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING (2005); MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT,
ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSMENT 1 (2003) (noting
that, for example, the human species “has always depended on the services provided by the
biosphere and its ecosystems.”).
5.
See Daily, supra note 4, at 3-4.
6.
See James Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the
Field, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 872 (2005).
7.
See, e.g. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, ET AL, ONE YEAR AFTER KATRINA: LOUISIANA
STILL A SITTING DUCK: A REPORT CARD AND ROADMAP ON WETLANDS RESTORATION (2006),
available at http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/5416_KatrinaReportCard.pdf
(citing loss of coastal marsh and swamp forests as factors contributing to Louisiana’s increasing vulnerability to hurricanes).
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systems provide, and of the enormous value and importance of
these services. 8 Studies indicate that the cost to replace the loss of
pollinating plants in the United States alone, as one example,
would be on the order of billions of dollars. 9
The need for regulation to protect ecosystem services also does
not appear to be in dispute. 10 Some scholars have suggested that
environmental law and policy have essentially “ignored” the challenge of protecting ecosystems and their services, despite their importance. 11 While market-based approaches and other strategies
that do not, in at least some formulations, require regulatory intervention hold promise and deserve consideration as well, 12 the
practical consequence of current market failures and the absence
of regulatory gap-filling is that those who engage in activities that
harm ecosystems and the services they provide are not being held
fully accountable for, or expected fully to address, these “negative
externalit[ies].” 13
8.
See, e.g., Salzman, supra note 6, at 871-72.
9.
See, e.g., id. at 872 and n. 2.
10. There is a vast literature on the appropriateness of regulation in different circumstances. See e.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE
ENVIRONMENT 68 (Wallace E. Oates ed. 1992); Don Fullerton & Robert N. Stavins, How
Economists See the Environment, in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: SELECTED READINGS 3, 5 (Robert N. Stavins ed., 4th ed. 2000) (noting that “negative externalit[ies],” such as
pollution, may produce a total social cost of production that exceeds the value to consumers,
so that regulation is appropriate because, “[i]f the market is left to itself, too many pollution-generating products are made.”). R. David Simpson highlights the need to consider the
value of ecosystem services in formulating regulatory strategies in Economic Analysis and
Ecosystems: Some Concepts and Issues, in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT; SELECTED
READINGS 529, 536-37 (suggesting that “[g]overnments must act to correct ‘externalities.’ . .
. . Pollution is the ‘classical example’ of [a negative externality.] . . . [W]e need to think
about the value of ecosystems and environmental amenities in order to make reasonable
social decisions concerning their conservation. The fact that many of the things we care
about are not traded in the existing economic system makes it more, rather than less, important that we think carefully about what their values really are.”).
11. Salzman, Thompson & Daily, supra note 3, at 311, 312 (concluding that “[d]espite
their obvious importance to our wellbeing, ecosystem services have largely been ignored in
environmental law and policy.”). For articles considering the adequacy of different environmental laws for protection of ecosystem services, see for example, Robert L. Fischman,
The EPA’s NEPA Duties and Ecosystem Services, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 497, (2001) (examining “the relationship between the EPA's NEPA duties and valuation of ecosystem services”);
J. B. Ruhl & R. Juge Gregg, Integrating Ecosystem Services into Environmental Law: A Case
Study of Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 365 (2001) (discussing the
federal wetland mitigation banking experience); James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887, 899 (1997); James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the
Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607 (2000) (examining use of
environmental trading markets (ETMs)); Salzman, Thompson, & Daily, supra note 3, at 311
(citing Janet S. Herman et al., Groundwater Ecosystem Services, 20 STAN. ENVTL L.J. 479,
481 (2001)).
12. See, e.g., Steven N. S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation,
16 J. L. & ECON. 11, 29-32 (1973) (concluding that there are situations in which the benefits
from ecosystems involved in pollination have been internalized through contracts that bee
keepers and farmers have negotiated).
13. See e.g., Fullerton & Stavins, supra note 10, at 5.
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This Article focuses primarily on the possible role that the
“back end” of the regulatory state, notably environmental enforcement, may play in protecting ecosystems and the services they
provide. 14 Effective enforcement has long been recognized to be a
central feature of effective regulation. 15 The oft-stated premise is
that without enforcement, compliance would suffer significantly,
thereby undermining achievement of the normative goals of underlying legislation. 16 For example, government permits that are intended to protect the environment by limiting destruction of wetlands or discharges of pollutants into streams are unlikely to be as
effective as possible if the regulated parties that are subject to
these permits violate their terms. 17 While improved regulatory
norms may be needed as well, regulated party compliance with the
norms that are in place is likely to advance protection of the envi14. My main purpose in this article is to make the general point that enforcement has
promise as a mechanism for protecting ecosystem services, and to explore the different types
of enforcement relief that may be especially valuable. To some degree, I conflate the concepts of protecting ecosystem functions and maintaining or protecting ecosystem services in
order to facilitate my making this broader point. While the two are, of course, related, there
are important distinctions as well. Enforcement intended to protect the environment may be
structured to protect ecosystem services, or not. For example, as Professor Ruhl points out
in his wetlands piece, wetland banking might be neutral with respect to ecological functions
in a watershed but, because it moves wetlands, have negative effects on the distribution and
absolute total of ecosystem services within the watershed. See Ruhl & Gregg, supra note 11.
Thus, if, for instance, a violator destroys or degrades wetlands in one location (place A), and
the government, through an enforcement action, enjoins the violator to restore wetlands in a
different location (place B), that injunctive relief might make the environment whole in the
sense that it would address any aggregate ecological impacts, but that relief might not restore service values to the human population around place A. This distinction between ecosystem functions and services has implications for the type of relief that is appropriate if the
goal is to redress harm to ecosystem services (in addition to redressing harm to ecosystem
functions). Those interested in pursuing relief that advances ecosystem services in particular would be well-advised to keep this distinction in mind, particularly to the degree that a
purpose of such relief is to redress the harm to ecosystem services that a violation causes.
One option is to require relief that would, in some way, offset the loss of the lost or reduced
ecosystem services.
15. See generally, A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of
Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45 (2000) (noting the importance of
public enforcement of law). Markell, Deterrence-Based Enforcement, supra note 3, at 12;
MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 224 (1955).
16. Markell, Deterrence-Based Enforcement, supra note 3, at 10-12.
17. There are questions concerning optimal levels of compliance, and optimal levels of
environmental protection. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297
(1999); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 15, at 72 (concluding that “it . . . appears that these
[present] levels [of deterrence] are often too low.… [S]ociety probably should raise levels of
deterrence in many areas of enforcement.”) I do not address these issues here. Compliance
with norms is a significant issue at all levels of governance. See, e.g., Jutta Brunnée, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the Compliance Continuum, in MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: PERSPECTIVES FROM SCIENCE, SOCIOLOGY
AND THE LAW 387, 387 (Gerd Winter ed., 2006) (noting that “[t]he promotion of compliance
with international environmental commitments is among the most challenging issues of
global environmental governance.”).
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ronment, including protection of ecosystems and the services they
provide.
I focus on the possible value that each of three “tools” in the
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) enforcement tool box
— 1) penalties, 2) injunctive relief, and 3) a form of “beyond compliance” injunctive relief, known as SEPs -- has for producing ecosystem benefits. 18 Theoretically, there are at least five ways in
which enforcement has the potential to protect the environment,
including ecosystems and the services they provide. First, enforcement has the potential to prevent harm to ecosystems by deterring violations that would cause such harm. Second, enforcement has the capacity to require violators to cease violations that
are causing or threatening harm. Third, enforcement includes the
authority to require violators to fix ecosystems they have harmed
(to restore or remediate harmed ecosystems). Fourth, EPA has
used enforcement to negotiate settlements that commit violators to
take action to benefit the environment in circumstances in which
EPA otherwise lacks the legal authority to compel performance of
such projects or to undertake them itself (to achieve protection “beyond compliance”). Finally, enforcement has the capacity to advance learning that will help to protect ecosystems and the services they provide. 19
The three enforcement tools I discuss in this Article appear to
have the potential to protect ecosystems in several ways. For example, EPA’s power to penalize violators enables the agency to de18. For a summary of different regulatory tools and approaches, see for example, U.S.
CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TOOLS: A USER’S
GUIDE OTA-ENV-634 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, 1995).
19. For a recent assessment of key data needs, see for example, THE H. JOHN HEINZ
III CENTER FOR SCIENCE, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, FILLING THE GAPS: PRIORITY
DATA NEEDS AND KEY MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES FOR NATIONAL REPORTING ON ECOSYSTEM
CONDITION 27 (2006), available at http://www.heinzctr.org/Programs/Reporting/Working%
20Groups/Data%20Gaps/Gaps_LongReport_LoRes.pdf (identifying ten key information gaps
that “prevent effective reporting on . . . the condition and use of U.S. ecosystems” and thus
limit our capacity for informed decision making.) A 2002 Heinz Center Report previously
found that nearly half of the 103 “ecosystem indicators” that “described ecological conditions
in the nation’s coasts and oceans, farmlands, forests, fresh waters, grasslands and shrublands, and urban and suburban areas” could not be reported on because of data gaps and
other deficiencies. Id. at 13. See THE H. JOHN HEINZ III CENTER FOR SCIENCE, ECONOMICS
AND THE ENVIRONMENT, THE STATE OF THE NATION’S ECOSYSTEMS: MEASURING THE LANDS,
WATERS, AND LIVING RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES 33-195 (2002), available at
http://www.heinzctr.org/ecosystems/pdf_files/sotne_complete.pdf. There is also much to
learn in terms of valuing ecosystems and their services. See, e.g., Jason F. Shogren, A Political Economy in an Ecological Web, in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: SELECTED READINGS, supra note 10, at 646, 656 (noting “that while nonuse values may be a valid concept,
the measurement tool is still blunt.”); Simpson, supra note 10, at 540 (“economists cannot
make any very precise statements about the values of most ecological goods and services. . .
. It will be a long time . . . before we can make as strong statements about the value of ecological goods and services as we can about, say, the value of a potato or a haircut.”).
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ter violations, particularly to deter regulated parties from violating
the law in ways that harm the environment (including ecosystems
and the services they provide). 20 EPA claims the injunctive authority as part of its enforcement arsenal to require regulated parties to end violations that are causing such harm and to repair any
harm their violations have caused. 21 In addition, for over two decades EPA has used its enforcement authorities to negotiate settlements of enforcement cases that commit violators to take steps
to protect and restore the environment that go “beyond compliance,” that is, beyond their obligations under the law. 22 Each of
these enforcement tools has the potential to advance learning that
is likely to be helpful in protecting ecosystems and their services.
Further, the latter two tools empower EPA to shift the burden of
doing much of this ecosystem-beneficial work to the regulated
community. 23 This feature is likely to be of particular appeal, especially during times characterized by scarce government resources and limited government capacity (i.e., all times). Enforcement offers an opportunity for environmental progress and new
learning that, quite simply, is not likely to occur if it were dependent entirely on government resources and initiatives.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of regulatory enforcement that offers a framework for considering the possible utility of enforcement in protecting ecosystems and their services.
Parts III-V review in more detail the three types of relief listed
above, notably penalties (Part III), injunctive relief (Part IV), and
“beyond compliance” actions that EPA commits regulated parties
to complete through negotiated settlements of enforcement proceedings (Part V). 24 I also include a brief conclusion.

20. See, e.g., CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING
RONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP (2003).

ENVI-

21. See Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg.
24796, 24797 (May 5, 1998) [hereinafter Final SEPs Policy].
22. Id.
23. Some economists would look at the efficiency of such expenditures regardless of
the party bearing them.
24. While my effort in this article is to focus on current key elements of EPA’s enforcement tool box, there obviously are an enormous range of possible mechanisms and approaches that may be helpful in protecting ecosystems and the services they provide. As
indicated in the text, this article focuses on the relatively incremental approach of revamping existing regulatory enforcement approaches as a possible strategy to increase protection
(including enhancement and restoration) of ecosystems that provide important services; it
does not consider fundamental restructuring of our regulatory apparatus as a way to
achieve this goal.

Spring, 2007]

THINKING INSIDE THE BOX

555

II. AN OVERVIEW OF EPA REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT 25
A. The Level and Nature of EPA Enforcement Activity
EPA’s enforcement world is a busy one. Agency officials undertake a significant number of inspections each year in order to
monitor compliance with the various environmental regulatory
statutes. In FY 2005, for example, EPA staff conducted 22,000 inspections and investigations. 26 Through a variety of means, including government inspections, self-reporting by regulated parties, and tips that workers and members of the public provide,
Agency staff annually discover significant numbers of violations,
including a substantial number that are serious enough to warrant
formal enforcement. To use the statistics from EPA’s most recent
fiscal year again, in FY 2005 EPA issued a total of 2,229 administrative penalty complaints and initiated 259 civil judicial referrals
(generally, referrals to the Department of Justice of cases involving violations of environmental laws for filing of civil complaints in
federal court). 27 In FY 2005, EPA finalized a total of 2,273 admin25. This article focuses on traditional enforcement situations, in which a regulated
party violates the law and the government decides to undertake a formal enforcement action against the party in order to obtain an adequate penalty and, potentially, appropriate
injunctive relief. The government uses a wide variety of compliance promotion tools beyond
traditional enforcement. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, FY 2005 PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, GOAL 5-1 (Nov. 2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/cfo/
finstatement/2005par/par05.pdf [hereinafter EPA FY 2005 Report]; Markell, DeterrenceBased Enforcement, supra note 3, at 8; RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 20, at 6083. While these are worth considering for their possible relevance to ecosystem services,
they are not the focus of this Article.
26. EPA FY 2005 REPORT, GOAL 5, supra note 25, at 160; see U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ANNUAL RESULTS: FY2005 NUMBERS AT A
GLANCE [hereinafter NUMBERS AT A GLANCE], http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/
reports/endofyear/eoy2005/2005numbers.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2007) EPA’s enforcement
efforts represent the tip of the iceberg in the enforcement arena. In many states, for one or
more of the major pollution control regulatory programs, state officials have primary implementation responsibility. David L. Markell, “Slack” in the Administrative State and its
Implications for Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (2005)
[hereinafter Markell, Slack]. This includes conducting inspections, reviewing facilitygenerated reports, identifying instances of significant non-compliance for possible follow-up
action, and undertaking such action in appropriate circumstances, either through administrative or judicial enforcement. See, e.g., ENVTL. COUNCIL OF STATES & U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, ONE STOP REPORTING PROGRAM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTANT REPORTING DATA IN
EPA'S NATIONAL SYSTEMS: DATA COLLECTION BY STATE AGENCIES 1 (1999) (suggesting that
states conduct approximately ninety percent of all inspections and initiate more than eighty
percent of all enforcement actions each year). The ideas explored in this Article are potentially relevant to state enforcement efforts as well. Furthermore, some of the regulatory
statutes require regulated parties to monitor their own compliance and to report the results
to the government. The Clean Water Act discharge monitoring report (DMR) program is
probably the best example of this approach.
27. OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, U.S. EVNTL. PROT.
AGENCY, EPA FY 2005 COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT ANNUAL RESULTS 7, 9 (2005) [hereinafter Annual Results], available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/end-
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istrative penalty order settlements and 157 civil judicial conclusions. 28 In FY 2005, EPA enforcement addressed a total of 5,137
facilities in 4,346 cases. 29
In short, on an annual basis, EPA: 1) invests considerable resources in the enforcement arena; 2) discovers a substantial number of significant violations; and 3) in numerous cases, initiates,
and ultimately completes, enforcement action. 30 In many of these
cases the Agency imposes penalties and requires significant violators to reduce pollutant discharges or otherwise act in ways that
enhance protection of human health and the environment. Increasingly, EPA has sought to monitor and measure the environmental impacts (benefits) of its enforcement actions. According to
an EPA FY 2005 report, “28.8 percent of enforcement actions required that pollutants be reduced, treated, or eliminated and populations and ecosystems be protected.” 31
In the following section I review the nature and mechanics of
contemporary enforcement in order to explore in some detail the
opportunities that this significant level of government activity potentially affords for protection of ecosystem services.
B. An Overview of Traditional Enforcement 32
The enforcement process, considered broadly, includes several
steps. Key elements include: 1) monitoring regulated parties’ performance of their legal obligations; 2) identification of violators; 3)
prioritization of violations (deciding which violations to pursue and
which to give low priority); 4) choice of an enforcement or compliance-promotion approach in particular cases; 33 5) pursuit of the
selected approach in cases for which the Agency decides action is
warranted; and 6) post-action follow-up (e.g., to assess whether a
violator has returned to compliance). 34
ofyear/eoy2005/2005resultscharts.pdf; NUMBERS AT A GLANCE, supra note 26.
28. Annual Results, supra note 27, at 8, 10; NUMBERS AT A GLANCE, supra note 26.
29. Annual Results, supra note 27, at 12.
30. I do not address here the merits of criticisms that there have been declines in
recent years in EPA (and state) enforcement activity.
31. EPA FY 2005 REPORT, Goal 5-3, supra note 25, at 152. Markell, Slack, supra note
26, at 59.
32. For a more comprehensive treatment of EPA enforcement, see generally, RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL , supra note 20; JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH
STAKES AND HARD CHOICES (Univ. of Texas 1995); Joel A. Mintz, “Neither the Best of Times
Nor the Worst of Times”: EPA Enforcement During the Clinton Administration, 35 ELR
10390 (June 2005).
33. EPA has expressed considerable interest in recent years in pursuing more cooperative and less adversarial responses to non-compliance, as have the states. RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 20, at 59.
34.
As is the case with many lists, this one creates somewhat artificial categories.
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EPA does not pursue a formal enforcement action in the vast
majority of situations in which it uncovers violations. 35 As might
be expected, EPA’s policy is to reserve initiation of formal enforcement proceedings for the most serious violations. Many of EPA’s
programs characterize these violators as being in “significant noncompliance,” or SNC. 36
The criteria EPA uses to determine the types of violations that
are significant and that warrant formal enforcement action have
been the subject of considerable debate over the years. 37 Each of
EPA’s major regulatory programs has developed specific definitions of “significant noncompliance.” 38 In some cases the program
offices have revisited these definitions periodically. 39 But, as
might be expected, a constant is that a key factor or criterion has
been the extent to which a violation has caused or threatened significant harm to human health or the environment. 40
EPA often considers seeking a variety of types of relief for violations for which the Agency determines formal enforcement action
is warranted. EPA typically will seek to require such violators to
It is possible (and reasonable) to categorize the enforcement process in different ways. U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, 1-5 (Feb. 1992).
Many of these elements include several components. Monitoring, for example, requires
deciding which sources to monitor (priority-setting, etc.), determining the nature of the
monitoring effort (the development of monitoring protocols and the like and deciding the
appropriate level of monitoring for different situations), and scheduling and performance of
inspections and other monitoring activities.
35. RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 20, at 82 (citing Richard G. Kozlowski &
Howard Bleichfeld, Wetlands Enforcement: Lion or Lamb?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Winter 1996, at 62). Instead, the Agency pursues informal strategies intended to promote compliance. RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 20, at 82 (citing SUSAN HUNTER & RICHARD WATERMAN, ENFORCING THE LAW: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACTS 50-65 (1996)).
36. Markell, Deterrence-Based Enforcement, supra note 3, at 4; Markell, Slack, supra
note 26. RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 20. There are instances in which the
Agency has departed from the SNC convention. See, for example, the Clean Air Act program’s use of the phrase “high priority violations.” Memorandum from Eric Shaeffer, Director, Office of Regulatory Enforcement, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Issuance of Policy on
Timely and Appropriate Enforcement Response to High Priority Violations 3 (Dec. 22, 1998)
[hereinafter EPA Memo], available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/
civil/caa/stationary/issue-ta-rpt.pdf.
37. Markell, Deterrence-Based Enforcement, supra note 3, at 24.
38. Id. at 43. For a recent example, see the EPA’s draft guidance for wet weather
discharges under the Clean Water Act, which describes circumstances in which such discharges constitute “significant” non-compliance with CWA permits. National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit Requirements for Peak Wet Weather Discharges From Publicly Owned Treatment Works Treatment Plants Serving Separate Sanitary Sewer Collection Systems, 70 Fed. Reg. 76013, 76015-18 (U.S. Entl. Prot. Agency Dec.
22, 2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPA-WATER/2005/December/Day22/w7696.htm.
39. Markell, Deterrence-Based Enforcement, supra note 3 at 45; RECHTSCHAFFEN &
MARKELL, supra note 20, at 164.
40. See e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, HAZARDOUS WASTE CIVIL ENFORCEMENT
RESPONSE POLICY 4 (Dec. 2003) [hereinafter HAZARDOUS WASTE POLICY], available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/rcra/finalerp1203.pdf.
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pay a penalty. 41 Each of the major environmental regulatory statutes contains a list of factors courts and EPA are to consider in determining appropriate penalty amounts in particular cases. 42 The
Agency generally considers three primary factors in determining
the appropriate size of a payable penalty — the “economic benefit”
the violator gained through its violations, an additional “gravity”
component that is based on the seriousness of the violation and
that is intended to put the violator in a worse position than a competitor that is in compliance with its legal obligations, and any “adjustment” factors, such as ability to pay. 43
In addition, particularly in cases in which a violation is ongoing
or there is a reasonable likelihood that a violation will recur, and
in situations in which the violation has caused an adverse impact
on human health or the environment, EPA will consider injunctive
relief, through which the Agency will require a violator to return to
compliance and to fix or remediate any environmental harm its
violations caused. 44
In some cases, EPA pursues other forms of relief as well. I focus on one such form of relief in this article, notably environmentally beneficial projects that violators agree to undertake, even
though they do not have a legal obligation to do so. These are negotiated projects incorporated into formal settlements used to resolve enforcement actions without litigation (or to conclude litigation). As part of such settlements, EPA generally reduces a violator’s payable penalty as the quid pro quo for the violator’s commitment to perform such “beyond compliance” work. EPA labels
these actions Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs). 45
The following data, from EPA’s report for the most recent federal Fiscal Year (2005), entitled FY 2005 Compliance & Enforcement Annual Results, shows the dollar value for each of the past
five years of each of these types of relief — penalties, injunctive
relief, and SEPs. As the Annual Results data reflects, in FY 2005
41. See e.g., EPA Memo, supra note 36, at 15.
42. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2000), 42 U.S.C. § 3008 (2000). Under most regulatory statutes
EPA has the authority to bring an enforcement action administratively or judicially. See
e.g., CWA § 309(b), (d); CAA § 113(b); RCRA § 3008(a), (g) (all authorizing civil actions);
CWA § 309(g); CAA § 113(d) (authorizing administrative enforcement penalties for violations)
43. See infra note 57 and Part II.B.
44. See CWA § 309(b); United States v. Alcoa Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1031 (N.D. Ind.
2000).
45. See infra Part IV. EPA has a variety of other enforcement-based tools as well
that I do not address in this article, including the authority to modify and revoke permits.
See e.g., HAZARDOUS WASTE POLICY, supra note 40, at 9. See also David L. Markell, States
as Innovators: It’s Time for a New Look to Our “Laboratories of Democracy” in the Effort to
Improve Our Approach to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347 (1994) (discussing
several types of enforcement authorities).
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EPA obtained relief worth more than $10 billion through its enforcement efforts: $154 million in payable penalties; $10 billion in
injunctive relief; and $57 million in violators’ commitments to conduct SEPs. 46 This is obviously a substantial amount of enforcement-generated relief. To provide one basis for comparison, the
value of this relief exceeds EPA’s entire budget, which in FY 2005
was less than $8 billion. 47

The question for this article is whether there is a role for one or
more of these forms of relief in protecting and restoring ecosystems
46. These figures understate the scope of government enforcement quite significantly
because they only cover EPA civil enforcement efforts. EPA also pursues criminal enforcement in appropriate cases. NUMBERS AT A GLANCE, supra note 26. Further, the figures do
not include information on enforcement relief obtained through state and local government
enforcement efforts.
47. See Budget of the United States Government, FY 2007, http://www.whitehouse.
gov/omb/budget/fy2007/epa.html (lasted visited Aug. 19, 2007) (indicating that EPA’s total
outlay in 2005 was just under $8 billion).

560

JOURNAL OF LAND USE

[Vol. 22.2

and the services they provide. I turn now to a more detailed look
at each of these forms of traditional enforcement relief in order to
explore this issue.
III. A MORE DETAILED LOOK AT PENALTY CALCULATIONS
This section contains an elaboration on five points that I think
are worth making in considering the promise of penalties for protecting ecosystems and their services. First, penalties give EPA
leverage to deter violators from committing violations that will
harm or threaten to harm such ecosystems and their services. 48
Related, Congress has periodically ramped up penalty levels to ensure EPA’s legal authorities are adequate to give it substantial
penalty leverage to promote deterrence. 49 Second, Congress and
EPA have embraced an “economic benefit plus gravity” framework
for determining appropriate penalties in particular cases; penalties
are to be sufficient to “disgorge economic benefit” (that is, to require a violator to pay an amount at least equal to the economic
benefit it gained through its violation), and also are to include a
“gravity” component that is tailored to the seriousness of the violation and puts the violator in worse position financially than if it
had complied with its legal obligations. 50 Third, there is theoretical support for EPA’s paying attention to harm in calculating penalties, in addition to considering economic benefit. 51 Fourth, there
is reason to believe that EPA may not be fully exploiting the leverage its penalty authorities provide it to promote deterrence because of the relatively little attention the Agency traditionally has
given in determining penalties to the harm (especially harm to
ecosystem services) that violations cause or threaten. 52 Finally,
there appears to be at least some practical capacity for EPA to do
better—that is, to increase the attention it gives to harm (including harm to ecosystem services) in calculating penalties. 53
In short, my premise is that, while 1) EPA’s legal penalty authorities give it the ability to deter violations, including violations
that harm ecosystems and the services they provide, through im48. Markell, Deterrence-Based Enforcement, supra note 3, at 40. I am not suggesting
that EPA is obligated to determine that any particular level of harm occurred when deciding
to pursue an enforcement case or determining to impose a penalty. Instead, EPA’s legal
authorities generally impose strict liability and do not require EPA to establish that a violation caused or threatened harm as a predicate for suit.
49. Infra note 54 and related text. See also Markell, Deterrence-Based Enforcement,
supra note 3.
50. See infra Part III.B
51. See infra Part III.C.
52. See infra Part III.D.
53. Id.

Spring, 2007]

THINKING INSIDE THE BOX

561

position of penalties that disgorge economic benefit and are tailored to the seriousness of the harm the violation caused or threatened, 2) theoretically, it makes sense for EPA to use this authority,
and 3) as a practical matter, EPA has some capacity to do so, 4)
there is reason to consider whether EPA is not using these authorities as effectively as it should to deter significant violations
because it is not paying enough attention to harm (including harm
to ecosystem services) in calculating penalties. In the remaining
portion of this section, I work through these four issues, pointing
out the significant empirical and other questions that need to be
addressed in testing the accuracy of this premise.
A. EPA’s Authority to Impose Penalties to Deter Significant
Violations
EPA’s authority to impose penalties gives the Agency significant leverage to create general and specific deterrence in order to
reduce the number and significance of violations of the environmental laws. Under many of the significant regulatory statutes,
EPA can impose substantial penalties — up to $32,500 per day,
per violation. 54 As a result, the maximum statutory penalty for a
set of violations can be quite high. For example, if a regulated
party violates a law such as the Clean Water Act for thirty days,
the total maximum penalty is $975,000 (thirty x $32,500). If the
regulated party has committed three different violations of the
Clean Water Act for a month, the total maximum potential penalty
increases to $2,925,000 ($975,000 x three). For cases that involve
multiple violations that continue for an extended period of time, in
short, the violator is potentially subject to significant penalties,
which easily extend into the multi-million dollar range. 55
EPA enforcement policies make it clear that, as noted above,
the EPA staff are to consider three key factors in determining ap54. Congress has increased the maximum penalties significantly over the years for
violations of major environmental regulatory statutes such as the Clean Water Act, Clean
Air Act, and RCRA. For example, the CWA provided for penalties not to exceed $10,000 per
day of violation until Congress increased this maximum civil penalty amount to $25,000 per
day in the 1987 Amendments. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, Title V, §313,
101 Stat. 45 (Feb. 4, 1987) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1319). Because Congress provided for
penalties to keep pace with inflation, the current statutory maximum is $32,500. Adjustment of Civil and Monetary Penalties for Inflation, 40 C.F.R. 819.4 (2007).
55. A January 2007 search of EPA’s Enforcement and Compliance History Online
(ECHO) database found that, in 2006, EPA settled 24 cases in which it assessed penalties of
$500,000 or more. Four of those were administrative cases, the rest judicial. See
http://www.epa.gov/echo/index.html. See e.g., Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304, 313-14 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that a violation of a monthly
average parameter constitutes a violation of each day of the month); cf. U.S. v. Allegheny
Ludlum Corp., 366 F.3d 164, 188-89 (3d Cir. 2004).
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propriate penalty amounts. First, the staff are to consider the economic benefit the regulated party gained through its violations.
Second, the staff are to consider the gravity or seriousness of the
violations. Finally, staff consider “adjustment” factors, such as
ability to pay. 56
EPA has made considerable progress in making the calculation
of economic benefit more routine, systematic, and consistent. It
has developed an interactive computer model known as BEN to
facilitate calculation of economic benefit. 57 BEN is intended to be
a user-friendly tool that “yields a reliable, objective dollar figure”
that represents the economic benefit a violator gained through its
violations. 58 The Science Advisory Board (SAB) has concluded,
and EPA enforcement officials have acknowledged, that the
Agency devotes the majority of its penalty calculation efforts to determining the economic benefit associated with particular violations. 59 The SAB has characterized recapturing economic benefit
that accrues from noncompliance as “the cornerstone” of EPA’s objective of using penalties to deter violators. 60
It is clear that Congress intended that EPA consider the seriousness or gravity of a violation in determining an appropriate
penalty. Most of the major statutes direct EPA to do so. Section
309(d) of the Clean Water Act (CWA) (covering civil penalties), for
example, provides that: “In determining the amount of a civil penalty the court shall consider the seriousness of the violation. . . . .” 61
Similarly, CWA section 309(g)(3) (covering administrative penalties) provides that: “In determining the amount of any penalty . . .
56. See e.g., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES
(GM-21) (Feb. 16, 1984) [hereinafter 1984 POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES], available at
http://www.wildlaw.org/Eco-Laws/civ-pen.htm.
57. ENFORCEMENT ECONOMIC MODELS, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/civil/econ
models/index.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2007). For articles about BEN by an EPA lawyer
who serves as the BEN Model Coordinator, see Jonathan Libber, Making the Polluter Pay:
EPA’s Experience in Recapturing a violator’s Economic Benefit from Noncompliance, 5th
Int’l Conf. on Envtl Compliance and Enforcement 465 (1998); Jonathan D. Libber, Penalty
Assessment at the Environmental Protection Agency: A View From Inside, 35 S.D. L. REV.
189, 193-97 (1990) [hereinafter Libber, View from Inside]. The Agency has refined its BEN
model several times. There is a long-standing debate about the appropriate scope of BEN,
particularly concerning the extent to which EPA should consider “illegally-obtained” profits
in calculating economic benefit. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, AN
ADVISORY OF THE ILLEGAL COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE (ICA) ECONOMIC BENEFIT (EB) ADVISORY PANEL OF THE EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, EPA-SAB-ADV-05-003 (Sept. 7, 2005)
[hereinafter SAB Report]. I do not address these issues here.
58. Jonathan Libber, EPA’s BEN Model Coordinator, indicates that 27 states were
using BEN to some degree as of 1990. Libber, View from Inside, supra note 57, at 193.
59. See SAB Report, supra note 57; Letter from Granta Y. Nakayama, Asst. Adm’r,
EPA, to M. Granger Morgan, Chair of EPA Science Advisory Board (Feb. 21, 2006) [hereinafter EPA Comment on SAB Report] (on file with the author).
60. SAB report, supra note 57, at 10.
61. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)(2002) (emphasis added).
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the Administrator . . . shall take into account the nature, circumstances, extent and gravity of the violation” in addition to the economic benefit the violator gained through the violation. 62 Section
3008(a)(3) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
likewise requires that, in “assessing . . . a penalty, the Administrator shall take into account the seriousness of the violation.” 63
It is also clear that in referring to “seriousness” or “gravity” of a
violation, Congress intended that EPA consider the environmental
harm or potential harm that a violation caused in determining an
appropriate penalty amount. 64 Numerous courts have so concluded. 65 Courts have increased the gravity component of a penalty in situations involving significant harm. 66 On the flip side,
courts have viewed the lack of such harm as a “significant mitigating factor” in determining a penalty amount, even in cases involving substantial numbers of violations. 67
In short, there is no statutory impediment to EPA’s considering
actual or potential environmental harm (including harm to ecosystems and the services they provide) in determining penalty
amounts. Instead, Congress intended and directed that the
62. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(3)(2002) (emphasis added).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(3)(2002). In the criminal context, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines indicate that a court should enhance a defendant’s offense level if the site cleanup
“required a substantial expenditure.” U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.3(b)(3)(1993)(requiring an enhancement “if cleanup [associated with an offense] required a substantial expenditure, increase
by 4 levels.” ) See also U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.2 (addressing toxic and hazardous pollutants); U. S. v.
Phillips, 367 F.3d 846, 857-58 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that courts should include calculations of cleanup expenses, including CERCLA expenses, in deciding whether to enhance a
sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.3((b)(3)). See also, U.S. v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, 1344-45
(concluding that “preliminary [site] examination [costs], which exceeded thirty thousand
dollars, are properly considered cleanup costs.”).
64. See e.g., U.S. v. Alshabkhoun, 277 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2002); Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 244 F.Supp. 2d 41, 49-50
(N.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that under the Clean Water Act courts should consider the severity
of the violations and their effect on the environment in determining penalties).
65. Trout Unlimited, Inc., 244 F.Supp. 2d at 50; U.S. Pub. Interest Research Group v.
Atl. 786 F.Sup. 747-49; Salmon of Maine, L.L.C., 257 F.Supp. 2d 407, 428 (D. Me. 2003)
(noting that the violations in this case “are of a significant nature. . . because they . . . inflict
a significant short-term damage on the environment . . . and endanger the survival of the
wild Atlantic salmon.”); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services
(TOC), Inc., 956 F.Supp. 588, 602 (D.S.C. 1997) (holding that “[t]he presence or absence of
environmental harm is relevant to the assessment of a Clean Water Act penalty.”).
66. EPA notes that “Courts have considered the extent of environmental harm associated with violations in determining the ‘seriousness of violations’ pursuant to the factors
in 309(d).” Revised Interim Clean Water Act Settlement Penalty Policy, Environmental
Protection Agency, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. 35618, 35622 n.18 (1995).
67. Laidlaw, Inc., 956 F.Supp. 588, at 602 (citing Hawaii’s 1000 Friends v. City and
County of Honolulu, 821 F.Supp. 1368, 1395-96 (D. Haw. 1993)) (adopting the view that “the
lack of [demonstrated] material harm . . . [is] a significant mitigating factor in assessing
penalties.”). But compare Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co.,
786 F.Sup. 747-49 (N. D. Ind. 1992), with U.S. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 972 F.Supp. 338,
344 (D. Va. 1997).
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Agency do so.
It also is clear that EPA has taken several steps to “operationalize” this Congressional direction to consider the significance of
violations, including the harm the violations cause, in determining
penalties. The Agency has developed general enforcement guidance that adheres to this statutory direction. EPA’s 1984 overarching enforcement directive, entitled A Framework for StatuteSpecific Approaches to Penalty Assessments: Implementing EPA’s
Policy on Civil Penalties, 68 directs each EPA media program (water, air, etc.) to “develop a system for quantifying the gravity of violations of the laws and regulations it administers.” 69 The Framework indicates that the system “must be based, whenever possible,
on objective indicators of the seriousness of the violation.” The
Framework provides that “[t]he seriousness of the violation should
be based primarily on: 1) the risk of harm inherent in the violation
at the time it was committed and 2) the actual harm that resulted
from the violation.” 70 In other words, elaborating on the “gravity
component” of penalty calculation, the Framework directs EPA
68. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, A FRAMEWORK FOR STATUTE-SPECIFIC APPROACHES
PENALTY ASSESSMENTS: IMPLEMENTING EPA’s POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES (Feb. 16,
1984) [hereinafter 1984 Framework], available at http://www.elistore.org/Data/guidance
documents/htmls/AD03225.htm. EPA intended that this Framework “provid[e] a framework
for medium-specific penalty policies.” EPA’s Framework is intended to be a companion
document to the Agency’s 1984 Policy on Civil Penalties, which was to “establish a consistent Agency-wide approach to the assessment of civil penalties. . . ,” and “to promote the
goals of deterrence, fair and equitable treatment of the regulated community, and swift
resolution of environmental problems.” Memorandum from Courtney M. Price, Asst. Adm’r,
Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring (Feb. 15, 1984) (on file with author). EPA intended in the Policy on Civil Penalties to “focus[] on the general philosophy” behind EPA’s
approach to penalties. Id.
The Policy directs EPA staff to assess penalties with three main components: 1) a
“benefit” component — “penalties generally should, at a minimum, remove any significant
economic benefits resulting from failure to comply with the law [p. 3], 2) a “gravity” component that “reflects the seriousness of the violation,” and 3) consideration of “adjustment”
factors such as ability to pay. POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES, supra note 56 at 3, 4, 8. Courts
have recognized that economic benefit may be difficult to estimate and, as a result,
“[r]easonable approximations . . . will suffice”. U.S. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 191 F.3d 516,
529 (4th Cir 1999) (citing Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc., 913 F2d 64, 80 (3d. Cir. 1990)). One court has suggested that the court’s job is
to reach a “rational estimate…resolving uncertainties in favor of a higher estimate.” U.S. v.
Municipal Authority of Union Township, 929 F.Supp. 800, 806 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (citing
Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1558). In the court’s view, “[i]t would eviscerate the [CWA] to
allow violators to escape civil penalties on the ground that such penalties cannot be calculated with precision.” Id. at 806-7.
The Policy on Civil Penalties indicates the benefit and gravity components will yield a
“preliminary deterrence amount” that is subject to adjustment based on several factors.
1984 POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES, at 8. The Policy indicates that EPA should provide specific incentives to settle by considering reducing the gravity component in situations in
which the violator institutes expeditious remedies to the identified violations and undertakes additional environmental cleanup. Id. at 6.
69. 1984 Framework, supra note 68, at app. II.A.
70. Id.
TO
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staff to assess violations according to the seriousness of the violation(s), with seriousness to be determined based on factors including “actual or possible harm.” 71
The Framework also directs staff to quantify the seriousness of
violations. The Framework’s offers the following guidance for doing so:
Assigning a dollar figure to represent the gravity of
a violation is an essentially subjective process.
Nevertheless, the relative seriousness of different
violations can be fairly accurately determined in
most cases. This can be accomplished by reference
to the goals of the specific regulatory scheme and the
facts of each particular violation. Thus, linking the
dollar amount of the gravity component to these objective factors is a useful way of ensuring that violations of approximately equal seriousness are treated
the same way. 72
Beyond its overarching Framework, EPA has further operationalized or implemented its approach to penalty calculation
through development of a series of program-specific policies. EPA
has issued at least 35 “penalty policies” or “enforcement response
policies” for its different programs. 73 There are variations among
these policies in their approach to environmental harm, but the
idea that EPA should consider environmental harm as a factor in
determining penalties is a common feature of these policies. 74
71. 1984 Framework, supra note 68, at II. The Framework provides that EPA should
consider the amount and toxicity of any pollutants involved, as well as the sensitivity of the
environment, in evaluating actual or possible harm. Id. See also SAB Report, supra note 57,
at II. (noting that EPA is to rank violations based on the seriousness of the act and consider
actual or possible harm in completing such rankings). In addition to actual or potential
harm, the Framework directs EPA staff to consider “importance to the regulatory scheme”
(that is, the importance of the requirement to achieving the goal of the statute or regulation)
in determining the gravity component of a penalty. Id.
72. 1984 Framework, supra note 68, at app. II.A. The Framework also reflects intention that EPA staff consider the harm a violation causes to the environment in determining
the gravity component of a penalty by providing that EPA staff may reduce the gravity
component of a penalty if the violator “cooperates” by correcting the environmental problem
prior to litigation. Such cooperation may justify a 50% reduction in the gravity component of
a penalty. Thus, a violator may be able to reduce its penalty by taking actions to abate or
redress environmental harm that it has caused, including to an ecosystem and the services
it provides. Id. at app. I.
73. EPA Comment on SAB Report, supra note 59, at 5.
74. I reviewed EPA’s enforcement or penalty policies for the CWA NPDES program,
the CWA § 404 program, RCRA, the CAA stationary source program, and EPA’s UST program in preparing this article. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REVISED INTERIM CLEAN WATER
ACT CIVIL PENALTY POLICY (June 2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/rcra/rcpp2003-fnl.pdf; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLEAN AIR ACT STA-
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Beyond this legislative and Agency policy direction that EPA
staff should consider harm in determining penalty amounts, the
Agency has identified key rationales for pursuing enforcement that
support such an approach as well. EPA has identified three basic
goals for its enforcement efforts: 1) deterrence, 2) fairness, and 3)
swift resolution of environmental problems. 75 Particularly when
violations cause significant harm, the theoretical literature suggests that imposing a penalty that incorporates such harm furthers at least the first two of these goals.
B. Theoretical Support for EPA’s Considering Significant
Environmental Harm in Determining Penalties
There is theoretical support for EPA’s considering harm in imposing penalties, particularly for significant violations that cause
or threaten substantial harm. 76 Failure to consider harm adeSOURCE PENALTY POLICY (May 2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/
resources/policies/civil/caa/stationary/penpol.pdf; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLEAN WATER
ACT SECTION 404 SETTLEMENT PENALTY POLICY (2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/
compliance/resources/policies/civil/cwa/404pen.pdf. Federal district court judges are not
obligated to use these guidance documents. For an example of a court deciding not to use
the Policy, see Laidlaw, Inc., 956 F.Supp. 588, at 601 (declining, in a citizen suit, to consider
EPA's March 1995 Interim Clean Water Act Settlement Penalty Policy in calculating an
appropriate penalty amount). States similarly are not obligated to use them. Some states
have developed their own policies, but not all. State approaches deserve focused attention,
particularly since states conduct the vast majority of enforcement.
75. 1984 POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES, supra note 56, at 1 (establishing a “single set of
goals for penalty assessment,” notably “deterrence, fair and equitable treatment of the regulated community, and swift resolution of environmental problems.”).
76. There is a considerable literature on the issue of optimal enforcement. Mark A.
Cohen, Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oil Spills: An Application of a
Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard, 30 J.L. & ECON. 23 (1987); Daniel A. Farber,
Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environmental Law,
23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297 (1999). For purposes of this article it is necessary only to make
the point that enforcement theory supports considering harm in a variety of contexts. To
provide a very brief and incomplete overview, there are two key types of deterrence, absolute and conditional. As the SAB has put it, society would never condone some offenses —
like violent assaults and rapes - and these are treated as “unconditionally deterred” offenses. They are to be deterred, regardless of the private benefit to the offender. One
framework for absolutely deterring violations in the environmental arena is to require the
violator to disgorge the economic benefit it has gained through its violations. The idea is
that if a rational economic actor knows that it will be required to disgorge any benefit it
gains from the violations, it will have no incentive to violate. Economists also recognize,
however, that this theory of absolute deterrence does not always work in practice, and that
it may be appropriate to consider harm or other factors to increase the penalty beyond economic benefit when the goal is absolute deterrence.
As the SAB and others have noted, environmental violations may also be treated under
a framework known as “conditional deterrence.” The notion here is that pollution is usually
a byproduct of a socially beneficial activity and therefore should be considered to be a “conditionally deterred” offense—one that we only want to prohibit when its overall social costs
exceed its overall social benefits. Economists suggest that harm is an appropriate basis for
determining penalties in a context in which the goal is conditional deterrence because under
this approach a violator’s incentive is to obey the law if the harm it will cause by violating
TIONARY
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quately in determining penalties may result in under-deterrence
(i.e., it may result in too high levels of non-compliance), particularly of violations that cause significant harm. Regulated parties
are more likely to commit violations that harm the environment
(and that reduce the services ecosystems provide) when the penalties imposed do not force the violators to internalize the costs of
such harm. 77
The SAB provides an example to explain why in order to
achieve appropriate deterrence EPA and other agencies should
consider the harm a violation causes in determining an appropriate penalty amount, particularly when the harm is significant:
It is worth emphasizing that this optimal penalty is
based on the “harm” caused by the offense, not the
“gain” to the offender. To take a simple criminal
example, if a mugger obtained $100 in a robbery and
the victim ended up spending three days in the hospital, a penalty based on the $100 gain to the offender would surely be too low — and would “underdeter” such offenses.
The appropriate penalty
would compensate the victim for three days in the
hospital and pain and suffering. In the context of
environmental offenses, suppose a firm fails to install a $100 safety valve and as a result 10,000 gallons of crude oil spilled into a sensitive coastal area.
The $100 “gain” to the offender would certainly not
be an appropriate starting point for a penalty. In
both of these cases, the problem is the failure to take
account of the harm done to the victim in setting the
penalty. 78

will exceed the benefit it will derive by doing so. Under this framework, a penalty based on
harm creates the proper incentives for behavior in the economics literature. It should be
noted that, under conditional deterrence theory, if the gain due to noncompliance is large
relative to the harm, a harm-based penalty will not deter noncompliance, but many economists are comfortable with this “conditional deterrence” result since, because the gain from
noncompliance exceeds the harm, noncompliance is actually the overall socially efficient
outcome. Some environmental violations are considered to be of the “unconditional deterrence” variety; thus, while economists might argue that they should be forgiven if the benefit from committing them exceeds the costs, the legislature has answered that question differently. SAB Report, supra note 57, at 25.
77. See SAB report, supra note 57. Penalty authority carries with it a risk of overdeterrence as well. This is true, for example, in a case in which a penalty includes an estimate of the harm that is too high.
78. Id. at 25. As noted, supra at note 76, there is an argument that, theoretically,
penalties that recoup economic benefit should absolutely deter violations. As the SAB puts
it, if EPA were in every case to impose a penalty equal to the gain to the offender divided by
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The threat of more significant sanctions for violations that
cause relatively significant harm also may provide what some
economists have characterized as marginal deterrence.
As
Polinsky and Shavell put it:
[E]xpected sanctions influence which harmful acts
individuals choose to commit. Notably, such individuals will have a reason to commit less harmful
rather than more harmful acts if expected sanctions
rise with harm. Deterrence of a more harmful act
because its expected sanction exceeds that for a less
harmful act is sometimes referred to as marginal deterrence. 79
Polinsky and Shavell conclude that:
Other things being equal, it is socially desirable that
enforcement policy creates marginal deterrence, so
that those who are not deterred from committing
harmful acts have a reason to moderate the amount
of harm that they cause. This suggests that sanctions should rise with the magnitude of harm. . . .
[M]arginal deterrence is naturally accomplished if
the expected sanction equals harm for all levels of
harm; for if a person is paying for harm done, he will
have to pay appropriately more if he does greater
harm.” 80
The SAB suggests that EPA should also consider harm in setting penalties because doing so will lead to more fair results (another policy objective EPA articulates in its enforcement policies):
An important aspect of fairness is the restoration of
the status quo: the law has been violated, and one
the probability of detection and punishment, it would never be in the potential offender’s
interest to violate the law. SAB Report, supra note 57, at 25. But, there are several circumstances in which this argument does not hold — e.g., if there is uncertainty as to whether
EPA will discover a violation, or pursue it, or be successful in determining, and requiring
the disgorgement of, the entire economic benefit. Id. at 25-26.
79. Polinsky and Shavell, supra note 15, at 63.
80. Id. “[M]arginal deterrence also can be promoted by increasing the probability of
detection as well as the magnitude of sanctions. For example, [as the SAB puts it,] kidnappers can be deterred from killing their victims if greater police resources are devoted to
apprehending kidnappers who murder their victims than to those who do not.” Id. This
point obviously has implications for the allocation of resources to, and design of, EPA inspection and monitoring schemes and their effectiveness in uncovering violations that
threaten or cause significant harm to ecosystems and their services.
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objective of the penalty system is to return to the
status quo before the violation occurred. . . .
[R]emoving the economic benefit is not the only action that might be required in order to restore the
status quo. With a violation of an environmental
regulation, there is a loss resulting from the polluter’s action in the form of some harm to the natural environment. Whether the natural resource that
is harmed belongs to a private individual or the general public, restoration of the status quo can call for
some appropriate compensatory action, perhaps in
the form of a penalty based on harm to the environment rather than on gain to the polluter. 81
To sum up, it appears to be undisputed that Congressional and
Agency policies direct Agency staff to consider environmental
harm (actual and potential) in determining penalty amounts.
There also appears to be theoretical support for EPA to pursue
such approaches. Thus, the major remaining questions involve the
extent to which EPA is, in fact, considering harm, including harm
to ecosystem services, in determining penalty amounts and, re81. SAB Report, supra note 57, at 1. The SAB characterizes as “the major focus” of
EPA’s penalty policy the fairness notion that the “restorative objective of a penalty system is
to undo the violation and return the situation to how it was before the violation occurred.”
Id. at 9. The SAB notes that restoring the status quo requires not only disgorging the unwarranted gain to the violator, but also making good on the “unwarranted loss” to some
other party. The SAB notes that a compensatory action could include both clean-up and
some form of environmental restoration. “The costs of clean-up and environmental restoration are thus compensation that should be paid by the polluter in order to restore the status
quo.” Id.
The SAB elaborates on this issue as follows:
In summary, the restoration of the status quo would appear to be an important aspect of the fairness objective in setting the penalty for a violation of an environmental regulation. This restorative goal can be seen to
have two possible implications. If one focuses on the polluter’s unlawful
gain, restoration of the status quo implies that he should give up the
gain. If one focuses on the unlawful harm to the environment, restoration of the status quo implies that he should pay an amount covering the
cost of cleanup and/or environmental restoration. In general, there is no
reason to expect that the two different approaches will lead to a similar
assessment of a monetary payment: the cost avoided by failing to control
pollution need bear no relationship to the damage caused by the pollution. This raises two questions: Which approach is presently adopted by
the EPA? Which approach seems preferable, or should they be combined
in some manner?
With regard to the first question, . . . the current EPA penalty policy . . . contain[s]
some elements of both approaches. . . .
Id. at 9-10.
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lated, the challenges associated with its doing so. It is to these
questions that I now turn briefly in the following section.
C. EPA’s Experience in Assessing Environmental Harm in
Determining Penalties and its Challenges in Doing So
A recent SAB report suggests the possibility of a significant
gap between the Congressional and Agency policy direction (discussed in Section III.A) and the theory supporting considering
harm (discussed in Section III.B), and the reality on the ground.
The SAB report indicates that the reality in the penalty calculation context is that, despite the direction in the generic and mediaspecific agency policies, EPA has traditionally focused much of its
penalty calculation efforts on the first prong in the Agency’s penalty calculation methodology, determining economic benefit, and it
has paid little attention to harm. 82 After spending almost two
years reviewing EPA’s approach to calculating penalties, 83 the
SAB noted that EPA devotes much more effort to determining and
recouping economic benefit than it pays to determining and
monetizing environmental harm as part of its gravity analysis.
“[T]he current EPA penalty process appears to focus overwhelmingly on the calculation of the unlawful gain to the polluter, with
no systematic consideration of the monetary value of the environmental damage caused by the violation….” 84 Along the same lines,
the SAB concluded that “[s]ince 1978, the EPA has made the violator’s economic benefit from . . . violating the Clean Air and Clean
Water Acts the centerpiece of its calculation of civil penalties.” 85
In its comments on the SAB report, EPA acknowledges this is the
case. 86
The SAB has concluded that it is feasible for EPA to calculate
harm, and has recommended that EPA embark on such an effort,
but EPA has not embraced this recommendation with open arms.
The SAB offers the following advice in its cover letter to the 2005
report: “The Panel believes that the state-of-the art in benefits estimation has progressed to the point where EPA should seriously
explore how it might incorporate ‘harm-based’ measures into its

82. SAB Report, supra note 57, at 10.
83. Mike Ferullo, Panel Says EPA Penalty Assessment Process Should Tally Value of
Environmental Harm, BNA DAILY ENV’T REPORT, Sept. 21, 2005, at A-8.
84. SAB Report, supra note 57, at 9-10. See also id. at 7 (asserting that, “[s]ince
1978, the EPA has based civil penalties under the CAA and CWA on the violator’s economic
benefit from noncompliance from violating the law.”).
85. Id. at 1.
86. EPA Comment on SAB Report, supra note 59.
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penalty formula. . . . ” 87 On the other hand, EPA points to various
constraints as an explanation for its limited consideration of harm:
“even when the harm can in theory be monetized, in almost all
civil penalty actions the analytical resources and efforts necessary
to accomplish this could be very substantial.” 88
The SAB’s optimism, coupled with EPA’s identification of roadblocks, suggests the possible value of more in-depth assessment of
the possibilities for developing greater agency capacity to integrate
harm-based evaluations into its penalty calculation methodologies.
Little such in-depth assessment has been done to date. Thus, my
main purpose in this section is to suggest the beginnings of a future research agenda to develop a better understanding of current
practices, and future challenges and opportunities. Questions that
deserve attention include: 1) How often does EPA consider harm,
including harm to ecosystem services?; 2) What motivates the
Agency to consider harm in some cases and not in others?; 3) How
does EPA carry out such efforts?; 4) Are there significant regional
variations in the answers to these questions; and 5) To the extent
there is a gap between theory and policy directives, on the one
hand, and implementation on the other, what are the practical
constraints or other factors that may account for this gap, and are
there ways EPA can overcome these constraints so the Agency is
able to consider harm to ecosystem services more than it does currently? The answers to these questions will help to inform consideration of the extent to which, and possible ways in which, EPA
can and should pay more attention to the harm (and potential
harm) a violation causes in determining the appropriate penalty.
A final observation is that EPA’s penalty calculation authorities provide it with a forum for promoting learning about ecosystem services. The ecosystem services literature is full of references
to data limitations. 89 To name three, there are significant limits to
our knowledge about: 1) baseline conditions — the current state of
the environment and the services it provides; 2) impacts — the extent to which different types of environmental insults cause harm
to different types of ecosystems; and 3) valuation — the dollar
87. Letter from Dr. A. Myrick Freeman III, Chair, Illegal Competitive Advantage
(ICA) Economic Benefit (EB) Advisory Panel, EPA Science Advisory Board, to Stephen L.
Johnson, EPA Administrator (Sept. 7, 2005) (on file with the author). See also SAB Report,
supra note 57, at 5, 26. In concluding that benefits estimation is feasible in some cases, the
SAB notes that “there is some continuing disagreement about the relative merits of alternative approaches and their overall reliability.” Id. at 26.
88. Id. at 4. EPA also indicates that “[w]hile the Agency’s penalty policies do consider
the environmental harm from the violations (when present),” it asserts that “the violations
EPA prosecutes rarely involve provable environmental damage.” Id.
89. See e.g., supra note 19.
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value of the level of harm particular violations cause. EPA has the
opportunity to advance learning in all three of these areas as part
of its efforts to calculate penalties. To provide one example, if a
violation harms a particular wetland, EPA has the authority, in
determining an appropriate penalty, to gather data on the natural
environment involved (e.g., the qualities of the wetland and the
services the wetland provides); it has authority to gather data on
the nature and extent of the harm that the violation caused to the
wetland and the services it provides; and the Agency has the authority to calculate, and place, a monetary value on this harm.
EPA can use these types of data-gathering and valuation efforts to
learn more about the particular resources involved. It also can incorporate this knowledge and expertise on a broader scale, to bolster our knowledge of natural inventories by improving our understanding of baseline conditions and services. Thus, in short, learning the Agency derives from calculating a “harm-based” penalty for
one set of violations may provide information that will facilitate
understanding, protecting, and restoring ecosystems and the services they provide in a range of contexts.
IV. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
As noted above, EPA’s enforcement authorities include the authority to impose injunctive relief, in addition to the power to impose penalties. In at least some circumstances, EPA has defined
the scope of its injunctive authority to include the power to require
violators to cease violations and to repair any harm the violations
have caused. EPA has noted, for example, that “[i]n settling enforcement actions, EPA requires alleged violators to promptly
cease the violations and, to the extent feasible, remediate any
harm caused by the violations.” 90
EPA’s injunctive authorities appear to give it significant opportunities to protect ecosystems and the services they provide, in at
least three ways. Most obviously, if a violation is causing harm to
an ecosystem or threatening to do so, EPA can enjoin the violator
to change its behavior by terminating the activities that are causing or threatening harm and to take steps to minimize the prospects for recurrence. There are limitations on EPA’s authority, including courts’ having the equitable discretion to determine appropriate relief in particular cases and thereby override EPA’s preferred approach. 91 Nevertheless, in broad terms EPA has long as90. Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg.
24796, 24796 (May 5, 1998) [hereinafter Final SEPs Policy].
91. Courts generally have extraordinarily broad equitable authority to “do justice” in
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serted the power to require violators to cease their violations and
return to compliance. 92
Second, as indicated in the initial paragraph in this section, in
at least some cases EPA asserts that its injunctive authorities empower it to enjoin a violator to act affirmatively to address harm
that it has caused. Professor Edward Lloyd and others have suggested limits to this authority. 93 In many cases, however, EPA
has negotiated agreements that obligated alleged violators to
remediate harm their violations have caused, and in others courts
or EPA’s judges or Environmental Appeals Board have required
violators to do so.
Finally, EPA’s injunctive authorities appear to give it significant capacity for learning that will promote protection of ecosystems and the services they provide by advancing understanding of
ecosystems and these services. As noted above, the ecosystem services literature identifies significant data-related shortcomings to
our ability to protect and restore ecosystems. These include limits
in our understanding of: 1) baseline conditions — the current state
of the environment and the services it provides; 2) impacts — the
extent to which different types of environmental insults cause
harm to different types of ecosystems and, related, the impact of
these harms on the capacity of ecosystems to provide services such
as pollination, flood control, and the like; and 3) the efficacy and
cost of different approaches to protecting and restoring ecosystems
and the services they provide. EPA has the opportunity to use its
injunctive authorities to advance learning in all three of these areas. To use the same example discussed above, if a violation
harms a wetland, EPA claims the authority, in determining appropriate injunctive relief, to: 1) gather data on the qualities of the
wetland and on the services the wetland provides; 2) develop inresolving cases involving violations of the environmental laws. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 320 (1982) (indicating that the CWA “permits the district court
to order that relief it considers necessary to secure prompt compliance with the Act”); cf.
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). (holding that Congress had limited
the courts’ traditionally broad equitable jurisdiction). EPA also has broad enforcement discretion to decide whether to prosecute, how to prosecute, and whether to settle a case. See
e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (an agency’s discretion not to enforce is generally committed to the agency’s absolute discretion); Oil Chemical & Atomic Workers v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’sn, 671 F.2d 643, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (EPA’s
enforcement discretion includes the discretion to settle a case).
92. 1984 EPA POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES, supra note 56.
93. Edward Lloyd, Supplemental Environmental Projects Have Been Effectively Used
in Citizen Suits to Deter Future Violations as Well as to Achieve Significant Additional Environmental Benefits, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 413, 425 (2004) (discussing amendments proposed to the CWA in 1993, which would have authorized courts to order a violator to restore
the natural resources damaged or destroyed as the result of the violation at issue, S. 1114,
103rd Cong. 262 (1993), and asking why such amendments were needed if courts already
have this authority).
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formation on the nature and extent of the harm that the violation
caused to the wetland and the services it provides; and 3) require
the violator to cease the violation that is causing harm (and to
identify and evaluate different options for doing so) and to abate
the harm that it has caused (again, after identifying and evaluating different options for doing so).
While the same types of barriers to EPA’s pursuing more harmbased penalty calculations exist in the injunctive relief context,
such as resource constraints, methodological challenges, and the
like, the fact that EPA has the ability in some cases to direct the
violators to do the basic investigatory and remedial or restorative
work means that EPA can reduce these barriers by shifting much
of the work to the violators rather than undertake this work itself.
While EPA needs to maintain the capacity to direct and oversee a
violator’s work, the resource demands should be less than if EPA
were doing the work itself. Further, the economic valuation work
will be in much less demand on the injunctive end of the relief
spectrum, thereby simplifying EPA’s methodological challenges in
justifying commitments from violators.
Another point worth mentioning concerning the promise of
EPA’s injunctive authority as a tool to protect ecosystems is that
EPA has structured its enforcement policies to create leverage for
its efforts to have violators undertake needed remedial work.
EPA’s Framework allows Agency staff to reduce the gravity component of a penalty significantly if the violator “cooperates” by correcting the environmental problem prior to litigation. 94 This approach obviously creates an incentive for violators to reach agreement with EPA on appropriate injunctive actions to abate and/or
redress environmental harm that they have caused, including to
an ecosystem and the services it provides, so that the violators
may reduce their penalty by taking such actions.
V. SEPS
EPA has coined the acronym SEPs (shorthand for Supplemental Environmental Projects) to refer to a third type of enforcementrelated relief that holds promise for advancing knowledge of ecosystems and the services they provide, and for protecting, restoring, and enhancing such services. This Part examines the poten94. 1984 Framework, supra note 68; See also Catskill Mountains Chap. of Trout v.
City of NY, 244 F.Supp. 2d 41 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (reducing penalty because of mitigation efforts). More generally, the Clean Water Act’s direction that courts consider a defendant’s
good faith effort to comply in assessing a penalty similarly indicates that efforts to comply
can help to mitigate a penalty. Laidlaw, Inc., 956 F.Supp. at 607-8.
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tial for SEPs to serve as a useful form of relief for improving protection of ecosystem services. 95
Commentators who have lauded the promise of SEPs as a
mechanism for enhancing environmental protection, including protecting ecosystems and the services they provide, have tended to
highlight two key features of SEPs. 96 SEPs are in a sense “environmental freebies” — projects that will have a positive environmental impact that would not be undertaken otherwise. 97 Further, EPA’s enforcement policies create leverage for EPA to persuade violators to undertake environmentally beneficial SEPs they
are not legally obligated to undertake, including the possibility
that EPA may reduce the penalty it will impose on a violator in
exchange for the party’s undertaking a SEP. 98
95. While I focus on EPA’s SEPs policies and practices, states’ interest in SEPs appears to have increased as well. A 2005 survey of State SEP approaches found that 30
states have adopted formal, published SEP policies, up from 19 eight years before. Steven
Bonorris et al., Environmental Enforcement in the Fifty States: The Promise and Pitfalls of
Supplemental Environmental Projects, 11 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 185, 188
(2005). Another 13 states also negotiate SEPs, but do so based on informal, unwritten practices. Id. Only two states, North Carolina and South Carolina have rejected SEPs. Id.
96. See David A. Dana, The Uncertain Merits Of Environmental Enforcement Reform:
The Case Of Supplemental Environmental Projects, 1998 Wis. L. Rev. 1181, 1181-83; Kenneth T. Kristl, Making a Good Idea Even Better: Rethinking the Limits on Supplemental
Environmental Projects, 31 VT. L. REV. 217 (2007); Lloyd, supra note 93, at 413-4. Cf. Bonorris et al., supra note 95, at 221 (suggesting that SEPs’ potential value extends beyond
providing environmental benefits in particular settlements to “hold[ing] the promise of a reinvented regulatory model, one of cooperative enforcement, rather than the procrustean
standard of traditional top-down, ‘command and control’ regulation.”).
97. For favorable characterizations of SEPs, see, e.g., Dana, supra note 96, at 1205
(noting that several commentators and others have referred to SEPs as “win-win” opportunities); Laurie Droughton, Comment, Supplemental Environmental Projects: A Bargain for
the Environment, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 789, 789 (1995) (referring to SEPs as a “bargain
for the environment”); Kristl, supra note 96, at 1 (characterizing a SEP as a “win-win”
proposition because the plaintiff “achieves both prevention and restoration,” the defendant
reduces its penalty, and the environment benefits); Lloyd, supra note 93, at 413 (concluding
that “[t]he use of citizen suit SEPs is widespread and largely successful.”). For expressions
of concern about SEPs, see generally, Michael Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 TUL. L. REV. 339 (1990); Dana, supra note 96, at 1184, 1215, 1216 (suggesting that SEPs may lower the cost of violating the environmental laws and thereby result in
undeterrence of such violations, and that, ultimately, SEPs are “an unattractive vehicle to
promote environmental good works” and suggesting that there are alternative means available for the government to promote environmental good works that do not undermine deterrence objectives — namely, government grants to regulated entities for such projects).
98. Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24803 (noting that “the enforcement context
has two distinct advantages. First, firms can be motivated to innovate . . . through penalty
reduction, improved relations with the Agency, and improved public relations. Second, since
the firm has committed to implement the innovative project in its consent agreement with
the Agency . . . there is a strong incentive to stick with the project even when technical difficulties arise. Enforcement thus creates a ‘window of opportunity’ in which options for technological change receive more serious consideration than usual.”). Defendants have other
possible reasons for agreeing to SEPs as well. See, e.g., Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 81, 87 (2002) (noting that industry groups and regulators have supported SEPs on the
grounds that they avoid or reduce litigation costs, foster fairness for regulated parties, and

576

JOURNAL OF LAND USE

[Vol. 22.2

EPA has had considerable experience with SEPs. The Agency
issued its Final SEPs Policy in 1998, 99 but the Agency had been
entering into SEPs for approximately twenty years prior to its issuance of the 1998 Policy. 100 The Agency has continued to give
SEPs substantial policy attention; it has issued at least 17 guidance memoranda on SEPs since 1998. 101
The Agency’s rhetoric has generally been quite supportive of
SEPs. In its 1998 Final SEPs Policy, EPA announced that it
“placed a high priority” on including SEPs in settlements. 102 EPA
has issued a series of post-1998 refinements to its SEPs Policy in
order to “help promote the use of SEPs in enforcement settlements.” 103 It has, for example, taken steps to simplify the process
for approval of SEPs and to increase incentives for violators to
agree to SEPs. 104 In a 2002 Memorandum, the Agency stated that
“increase popular support.” They also may engender a greater degree of cooperation among
regulators, regulated parties, and interested citizens.) Professor David Dana identifies a
variety of reasons why regulators may be favorably disposed to SEPs. Dana, supra note 96,
at 1200-1 (suggesting that regulators may generate political backing from local residents
and that this increased local goodwill may produce more resources. Further, “[i]ncreased
local goodwill may translate into purely psychic benefits for regulators. [R]egulators may
experience psychic satisfaction in witnessing an environmental improvement that results
directly from their efforts.” Regulators may find it beneficial to use SEPs as a learning opportunity or as a “testing ground” for future regulatory programs.). Dana also suggests that
SEPs may be beneficial by engendering greater internalization of “the norms of good environmental citizenship” and therefore lead to increased compliance. Id. at 1211. For general
reasons why defendants might opt to settle a case rather than litigate it, such as the cost of
litigation and the risks inherent in litigation, see Robert D. Cooter and Daniel L. Rubinfield,
Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 27, pp. 1067-97
(1989) (providing survey results).
99. Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90.
100. Id. For two recent, detailed historical reviews of EPA’s development and use of
SEPs, see generally, Kristl, supra note 96; Lloyd, supra note 93. Citizens negotiate SEPs in
settling enforcement cases as well. See, e.g., Lloyd, supra note 93, at 413 (noting that the
“use of citizen suit SEPs is widespread and largely successful”); Greve, supra note 97.
101. EPA provides a list of its SEPs Policy and Guidance online. SEPs Policy and
Guidance, http://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/seps (last visited Aug. 18,
2007). They cover the availability of SEPs in a wide range of enforcement contexts (for example, settlements with municipalities of CWA enforcement case, green buildings, retrofitting school buses, etc.). See also Memorandum from Phyllis Harris, Principal Deputy Asst.
Adm’r, EPA OECA, to Reg’l Adm’rs, Clarification and Expansion of Environmental Compliance Audits under the Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy (Jan. 10, 2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/seps/sepauditclar-mem.pdf
(advising that EPA is expanding the environmental compliance audit category of SEPs) and
Kristl, supra note 96, at 17.
102. Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24796.
103. Memorandum from John Peter Suarez, Asst. Adm’r, EPA OECA, to Asst. Adm’rs
et al., Expanding the Use of Supplemental Environmental Projects 3 (June 11, 2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/seps/seps-expandinguse.pdf
[hereinafter Suarez, Expanding Use].
104. Id. In addition, EPA has included a project idea form on its website; it develops a
project ideas memorandum that it updates and sends out regularly; and it provides SEP
information on the Enforcement and Compliance History Online system (www.epa.gov/
echo). E-mail from Beth Cavalier, Special Litigation and Project Division, EPA OECA, to
author (Feb. 28, 2007, 07:21:00 EST) (on file with the author).
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“SEPs are an important part of the settlement process and are an
appropriate means to further Agency enforcement goals and objectives. We encourage the Regions to continue to promote SEPs and
look for opportunities to incorporate such projects into their settlements.” 105 Echoing the Agency’s rhetoric, Professor David Dana
suggested in a 1998 article that “the use of SEPs by public regulators . . . soon will become (or arguably already has become) a major
component of environmental enforcement.” 106
In light of the internal and external optimism about SEPs and
support for them, EPA’s track record in negotiating SEPs might
come as a bit of a surprise. The use of SEPs has not increased
substantially, as one might expect from EPA’s rhetoric. 107 Instead,
as the Annual Results data above reflects, in EPA’s FY 2001, EPA
estimated the value of the SEPs it entered into that year to be
about $90 million, while over the past four years, the value of
SEPs has declined to amounts in the range of $45-$65 million annually. 108 Data that Professor Kenneth Kristl has compiled indicates that the number of SEPs has not increased in recent years
either. 109
The rest of this Part reviews key features of SEPs. It concludes
by identifying, and briefly exploring, several possible strategies for
expanding use of SEPs beyond historic and current levels.
A. Definitions: What are SEPs?
As EPA explains, SEPs have a unique role in EPA’s enforcement tool box. They are intended to “obtain environmental and
public health protection and improvements that may not otherwise

105. Memorandum from Sylvia Lowrence, Acting Asst. Adm’r, EPA OECA, to Regl.
Adm’rs, Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) Policy, (Mar. 22, 2002), available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/seps/sepguide-mem.pdf [hereinafter
Lowrence, 2002 SEPs Memo].
106. Dana, supra note 96, at 1181 n.1.
107. See Dana, supra note 96, at 1181 (anticipating a significant increase in SEPs).
108. Id.. While David Dana reported in 1998 that the dollar value of SEPs in FY 1995
substantially exceeded the value of civil and administrative penalties that EPA assessed
($103,840,773 vs. approximately $70 million), in 1996, SEPs declined to $65 million, while
civil and administrative penalties increased to more than $96 million. Dana, supra note 96,
at 1189. The Annual Results, supra note 27, at 5, which brings these figures up to date for
the past five years, reflects that while the ratio of the value of SEPs to the value of civil
penalties was relatively stable from 2001-2003, at about 65-70% (2001 = 71%, or 89/126;
2002=64%, or 58/90; and 2003 = 68%, or 65/96), there has been a dramatic drop-off in SEPs
the past two years. In 2004, the ratio is only 32%, $48 million SEPs/$149 million civil penalties; and in 2005 the ratio was 37%, $57 million/$154 million. Professor Kenneth Kristl
has compiled information on the numbers of SEPs negotiated over the past several years.
See Kristl, supra note 96.
109. See Kristl, supra note 96.
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have occurred . . . .” 110 In this way they complement EPA’s traditional injunctive authority to require violators to cease violations
and remediate any harm the violations have caused. 111
EPA has established three threshold criteria for consideration
of a project as a SEP. First, the project must be “environmentally
beneficial.” EPA explains that “environmentally beneficial” means
a “SEP must improve, protect, or reduce risks to public health, or
the environment at large.” 112
Second, the violator must not be legally obligated to perform
the project that it will undertake as a SEP. EPA notes that, for
example, “if a court is likely to order a defendant to perform a specific activity in a particular case, such an activity does not qualify
as a SEP.” 113
Third, the alleged violator must commit to perform the project
as part of a settlement of an enforcement action. 114 SEPs are
available only in the enforcement arena; they are not available as
part of EPA’s regulatory process (for example, as permit conditions
EPA includes in authorizing a facility to operate under one or more
environmental laws) or through EPA’s exercise of its rulemaking
authorities. Further, in the enforcement arena, EPA only pursues
SEPs in settlements, not as relief in litigated cases. 115
B. Additional Requirements for and Features of SEPs
EPA has established additional requirements for approval of
SEPs, directing that its staff use a four-step process in considering
a possible SEP project, after ensuring that the project meets the
definition of a SEP: 1) the project must satisfy all legal guidelines
(including “nexus”); 2) it must fit within a designated category of
SEPs; 3) EPA staff must determine the appropriate amount of
penalty mitigation; and 4) EPA staff must ensure that a project
satisfies various implementation and other criteria. 116 This sec-

110. Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24796 (emphasis added).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 24798.
113. EPA notes that “[t]he statutes EPA administers generally provide a court with
broad authority to order a defendant to cease its violations, take necessary steps to prevent
future violations, and to remediate any harm caused by the violations.” Final SEPs Policy,
supra note 90, at 24798 n.3. EPA continues: “[i]f a court is likely to order a defendant to
perform a specific activity in a particular case, such an activity does not qualify as a SEP.”
Id.
114. Id. at 24797 (noting that “[t]his is a settlement policy and thus is not intended for
use by . . . courts. . . .”). Some commentators have suggested that courts retain the equitable
discretion to require SEPs. Kristl, supra note 96, at 15.
115. Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24797-98.
116. Id. at 24797.
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tion briefly reviews each of these steps. 117
1. Legal Guidelines 118
SEPs raise at least two threshold legal questions: 1) whether
EPA has the legal authority to negotiate commitments to perform
environmentally beneficial work that it cannot require a defendant
to undertake; and 2) whether EPA has the authority to reduce the
size of a penalty in exchange for such a commitment?
The short answer is that for the past twenty-plus years, EPA
has answered each of these questions in the affirmative, in its
various SEPs policies and elsewhere. The Agency has consistently
claimed that it has authority to negotiate commitments for work
that it lacks legal power to impose or require; and, further, the
Agency has the ability to offer reduced penalties in exchange for
such commitments. 119
The Agency has, however, established certain “legal guidelines”
to bolster its legal position that SEPs are defensible, including requiring a “nexus” between a proposed project and the violations at
issue. 120 In its 1998 SEPs Policy, EPA indicates that the requisite
117. For more extensive treatment, see generally Lloyd, supra note 93; Kristl, supra
note 96; Dana, supra note 96.
118. Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24798-99.
119. EPA’s lawyers and others claim that EPA has the authority to enter into SEPs
that commit alleged violators to take action that EPA could not order the violators to undertake because the SEPs are the result of negotiations and, as a result, they are projects the
violator has entered into willingly. Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 247897-98. I do not
address the merits of this issue in this article. For legal analyses of EPA’s authority, see for
example, Kristl, supra note 96, at 24-34; Dana, supra note 96, at 1182-1184 (suggesting that
“[t]he only serious controversy regarding SEPs has concerned their statutory basis,” and
summarizing some of the arguments pro and con); Lloyd, supra note 93, at 413-15 (concluding that “[b]oth the courts and Congress have accepted, if not actively encouraged, SEPs
either by affirmative approvals or passive acceptance” and that EPA has “adopted SEPs as a
major component of its own enforcement regime.”) (Professor Lloyd acknowledges that he is
an attorney with Columbia’s law clinic, has brought several citizen suits that included
SEPs, and is a strong advocate for SEPs); and Bonorris et al., supra note 95, at 198, 199
(“courts have upheld the legality of consent decrees that go beyond the express relief outlined in a statute, with the proviso that the decrees are consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute.”).
EPA, and the U.S. government through the Department of Justice, have opposed SEPs
in citizen suits in some cases. Lloyd, supra note 93, at 430 (suggesting that EPA and DOJ
have “kept a watchful eye” on settlements of citizen suits). Lloyd notes that courts “ordinarily” have entered proposed consent decrees resolving citizen suits with a SEP component, even over EPA and DOJ objections. Id.
120. See e.g., Suarez, Expanding Use, supra note 103.
To ensure that the Agency’s enforcement discretion is used appropriately
and in compliance with the U.S. Constitution and the MRA, all SEPs
must satisfy several key elements. To be approved as a SEP, a project
must: 1) Be related to or have a “nexus” to the underlying violation; 2)
Provide significant environmental and public health benefits; 3) Benefit
the community affected by the violation; and 4) Secure public health
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relationship between a project and a violation may exist in any of
three ways: 1) the project will reduce the likelihood that similar
violations will occur in the future; 2) the project will reduce the adverse impact to public health or the environment to which the violation at issue contributes; or 3) the project will reduce the overall
risk to public health or the environment potentially affected by the
violation at issue. 121
This broad definition of SEPs seemingly would include a significant number of projects that have the potential to improve the
environment. For example, under the third type of nexus, a SEP
project would seem to have adequate nexus if the project operates
to protect or enhance a part of the environment if a violation poses
a risk to that part of the environment, such as a particular ecosystem. There is some suggestion that EPA is prepared to define
“nexus” even more broadly than that. EPA’s SEPs Policy continues that “[n]exus is easier to establish if the primary impact of the
project is . . . in the same ecosystem or within the immediate geographic area.” 122 Implicit in this is that a SEP is approvable even
and/or environmental improvements beyond what can be achieved under
applicable environmental laws.
Id. at 2. Not all commentators agree that nexus is needed. See e.g., Kristl, supra note 96.
EPA has established other limitations on SEPs as well. For example, the Final SEPs Policy
indicated that SEPs may not be profitable to a defendant. Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90,
at 24798. EPA modified this policy in 2003, issuing a memorandum that EPA may accept
SEPs that prove profitable to a defendant in some cases. Memorandum from John Peter
Suarez, Asst. Adm’r, EPA OECA, to Reg’l Counsel et al., Guidance for Determining Whether
a Project is Profitable, When to Accept Profitable Projects as Supplemental Environmental
Projects, and How to Value Such Projects (Dec. 5, 2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/
compliance/resources/policies/civil/seps/seps-profitableprojects.pdf.
121. Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24798. The other four “legal guidelines”
that EPA identifies in its Policy appear to limit the availability of SEPs in ways that might
limit SEPs for ecosystem services in some contexts, but by no means all. Thus, a project
cannot be “inconsistent with any provision of the underlying statute;” EPA cannot play a
role in managing or controlling funds for the SEP or manage the SEP, but it can oversee it;
the settlement agreement must provide sufficient detail concerning the project; and EPA
cannot use a project to meet its statutory obligations or another agency’s obligations. Id. at
24798. EPA’s Lowrence, 2002 SEPs Memo, supra note 105, reiterates these elements of the
Policy. The 2002 SEPs Memo also lists other restrictions:
7) A project may not provide EPA . . . with additional resources to perform a particular activity for which Congress has specifically appropriated funds.
8) A project may not provide additional resources to support specific activities performed by EPA employees or EPA contractors.
9) A project may not provide a federal grantee with additional funds to
perform a specific task identified within an assistance agreement.
10) Projects that involve only contributions to a charitable or civic organization are not acceptable.
Id. at 2.
122. Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24798.
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if it may benefit other ecosystems or other geographic areas; presumably, in some cases, even if its primary impact is to do so. 123
In sum, EPA’s definition of “nexus” in its 1998 Policy appears
to create the potential for a broad range of SEPs that could protect
ecosystems and the services they provide. 124 A 2002 Memorandum
from EPA’s Director of Office of Regulatory Enforcement that focused on the “nexus” requirement indicates that “[i]n most cases,
nexus is not difficult to establish.” 125
Further, as one commentator has noted, EPA’s “consistent
theme” in its post-1998 SEPs Policies has been to encourage
Agency staff to expand their use of SEPs. 126 In a June 2003 memorandum, aptly entitled Expanding the Use of Supplemental Environmental Projects, for example, EPA’s then head of enforcement
urged agency staff to “consider every opportunity to increase our
use of SEPs and include more environmentally significant SEPs
whenever possible.” 127 The memorandum indicates that during FY
2002, 10 percent of EPA’s civil penalty settlements included a SEP,
but urged that, while EPA “should be proud of these figures,” “we
have a tremendous opportunity to achieve greater benefits for the
environment and communities affected by violations.” 128 In a December 15, 2003 Guidance, EPA’s enforcement head identified opportunities to expand the universe of potential SEPs. He indicated
that EPA staff may, in certain circumstances, aggregate SEPs in
multiple cases (e.g., EPA may allow regulated parties to pool re123. For example, EPA officials indicated that if a violation occurs in a tributary or
stream of a larger river; the SEP may take place in a different part of the river to improve
the overall quality of the river as a whole. E-mail from Beth Cavalier, supra note 104. On
the other hand, in an October 2002 memorandum, EPA suggests that “geography alone does
not create nexus. The mere fact that a SEP is beneficial to an area near a facility does not
by itself satisfy the nexus requirement. Enforcement staff must be able to demonstrate
how the project relates to the violations that are the subject of the enforcement action.”
Memorandum from Walker Smith, Dir., Office of Regulatory Enforcement, to Reg’l Counsel,
Importance of the Nexus Requirement in the Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy 2
(Oct. 31, 2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/seps/
sepnexus-mem.pdf [hereinafter Smith, Importance of the Nexus]. (ORE is now called the
Office of Civil Enforcement.) Thus, while geography does not appear to be necessary in all
cases to establish nexus, it is also not necessarily sufficient to do so. Kristl, supra note 96.
124. See Dana, supra note 96, at 1186 (noting that the SEPs policy defines nexus
broadly).
125. Smith, Importance of the Nexus, supra note 123, at 1. Also see infra notes 168179 and accompanying text.
126. Kristl, supra note 96, at 18.
127. Suarez, Expanding Use, supra note 103, at 1; see also Memorandum from John
Peter Suarez, Asst. Adm’r, EPA OECA, to Reg’l Counsels et al., Guidance Concerning the
Use of Third Parties in the Performance of Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs)
and the Aggregation of SEP Funds (Dec. 15, 2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/seps/seps-thirdparties.pdf [hereinafter Suarez, 2003 Guidance].
128. Suarez, Expanding Use, supra note 103, at 1; see also Suarez, 2003 Guidance,
supra note 127 (to the same effect).
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sources to implement a consolidated SEP), noting that aggregation
“could provide increased leverage and allow for projects with a
greater environmental or public health benefit. . . .” 129 Similarly,
he indicated that in some circumstances EPA staff may negotiate
“complementary, segregable SEPs” with defendants in different
cases that are, for example, interested in performing “discrete and
segregable tasks within a larger project.” 130 Such projects “can result in a significant environmental or public health benefit that
might otherwise be unavailable.” 131
Specific categories of projects EPA has identified as suitable for
SEPs reinforce the message embodied in the rhetoric summarized
in this section, notably that EPA’s approach to SEPs appear to
make them well-suited for ecosystems protection-related projects.
2. Specific Categories of Projects
EPA lists seven specific categories of projects that may qualify
as SEPs. This list provides strong evidence that EPA is prepared
to approve SEPs that have significant potential to protect ecosystems and the services they provide. 132 For example, EPA’s fourth
category of permissible SEPs, entitled “Environmental Restoration
and Protection,” refers explicitly to projects “which enhance[ ] the
condition of the ecosystem or immediate geographic area adversely
affected.” 133 The Agency continues: “These projects may be used to
restore or protect natural environments (such as ecosystems). . . .
This category also includes any project which protects the ecosystem from actual or potential damage resulting from the violation
or improves the overall condition of the ecosystem.” 134 EPA lists
“[restoration of] a wetland in the same ecosystem . . . in which the

129. Suarez, 2003 Guidance, supra note 127, at 2.
130. Id.
131. Id. On the other hand, then Enforcement head Suarez indicates that EPA’s OGC
vetoed the idea of aggregating SEP funds because of concerns that doing so would raise
questions under the MRA. “A cash payment, such as a payment . . . to a SEP ‘bank,’ where
there is no further responsibility for the defendant . . . to ensure that a specific project is
completed, is prohibited because it could easily be construed as a diversion from the Treasury of penalties due and owing the government.” Id. at 3. Suarez indicates that defendants
may hire third parties to assist with SEPs, so long as the defendant retains full responsibility for the SEP. A defendant may not negotiate a SEP that involves making a cash payment
to a third party to conduct the SEP without the defendant’s retraining full responsibility. Id.
at 4.
132. Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24799-24800; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, EPA 325-R-01001, BEYOND COMPLIANCE: SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS, at 4-5, (Jan. 2001) [hereinafter BEYOND COMPLIANCE].
133. Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24799.
134. Id.
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facility is located” as one such project. 135 The Agency also lists as a
permissible project the “purchase and management of a watershed
area by the defendant/respondent to protect a drinking water supply where the violation (e.g., a reporting violation) did not directly
damage the watershed but potentially could lead to damage due to
unreported discharges.” 136 EPA’s 1998 SEPs Policy also provides
that projects that have “environmental merit” may qualify as a
SEP even if the projects do not fit within one of the seven specified
categories, with the approval of EPA’s enforcement office. 137
A January 5, 2004 EPA Memorandum, Recommended Ideas for
Supplemental Environmental Projects, 138 includes an updated list
of potential SEPs projects that EPA indicates it will support (any
of these projects must still meet all conditions of the SEPs Policy if
proposed for inclusion in a particular settlement). Several of the
types of projects EPA lists in this Memorandum similarly reflect
EPA’s policy position that SEPs may encompass protection and
restoration of ecosystems and ecosystem services:
Implement projects that create, restore and/or preserve threatened aquatic resources, including wetlands. Mechanisms to accomplish this goal can include:
- Aquatic resource restoration project
- Land trust projects to preserve aquatic resources
threatened with degradation or destruction by
unregulated activities.
- Purchasing and retiring credits from mitigation

135. Id.
136. Id.; see also, BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 132, at 5 (noting that “[f]or example, by purchasing land or developing conservation programs for the land, a company could
protect a natural habitat for wildlife or a source of drinking water. Beyond preservation,
such a SEP might involve restoring natural areas that are vital to long-term protection of
the environment or public health.”). Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24799; Bonorris et
al., supra note 95, at 204 and n.149;
137. Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24,796-801.
138. Memorandum from John Peter Suarez, Asst. Adm’r, EPA OECA, to Asst. Adm’rs
et al., Recommended Ideas for Supplemental Environmental Projects (January 5, 2004) (on
file with the author) [hereinafter Suarez, Recommended Ideas for SEPs]. EPA also has developed a more recent document entitled “Project Ideas for Potential Supplemental Environmental Projects” (updated July 2006), available at http://www.epa.gov/Compliance/resources/policies/civil/seps/potentialproject-seps0607.pdf. The latter document is a list of
possible SEPs that NGOs and government agencies have submitted. EPA includes a disclaimer at the outset that “[i]nclusion of a project [on the list] does not constitute or imply
[EPA’s] endorsement. . . .” Id. EPA also has encouraged its Regional offices to consider development of SEP libraries. U.S. Envtl. Protect. Agency, Interim Guidance for Community
Involvement in Supplemental Environmental Projects, 68 Fed. Reg. 35884, 35885 (June 17,
2003) [hereinafter EPA, Community Involvement Guidance].
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banks approved by EPA and the Corps. 139
Some of EPA’s program-specific policies identify possible SEPs projects as well. EPA’s Section 404 Penalty Policy, for example, offers
the following regarding SEPs:
SEPs are particularly encouraged in the Section 404
program if the SEP results in protection of a wetland
resource or other special aquatic site. For example,
purchase and dedicated use of buffer land around a
wetland helps ensure the survival of wetland resources, and is an appropriate and valuable SEP, as
is upland land acquisition lying in wetland mosaics.
In addition, deeding over wetlands in perpetuity for
the purpose of conservation promotes program interests and the goals of the Clean Water Act. 140
In short, EPA’s SEPs policies, and some of its program-specific
enforcement policies, define permissible (and desirable) SEPs in a
way that encompasses projects that will protect, enhance, and restore ecosystems. 141 In at least some circumstances, these projects
may focus on ecosystems other than the one that a violator has
harmed. In this way, SEPs would seem to have the potential to
serve as a helpful compliment to EPA’s traditional injunctive relief
authority in protecting and restoring ecosystems and the services
they provide.
3. SEPs’ Penalty Mitigation Potential
The discussion in the preceding two sections highlights the potential value of SEPs as a “beyond compliance” tool that EPA potentially can use to require protection and restoration of ecosystems. A violator may, however, need to spend considerable funds
to negotiate a SEP with EPA, to develop and implement the SEP,
and to monitor and document its effectiveness. Further, a violator
139. Suarez, Recommended Ideas for SEPs, supra note 138.
140. Memorandum from Sylvia Lowrance, Acting Asst. Adm’r, EPA OECA, to Waters
Prot./Mgmt. Div. of Dir. et al., Issuance of Revised CWA Section 404 Settlement Penalty
Policy 20 (Dec. 21, 2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/
civil/cwa/404pen.pdf. EPA’s 404 Policy continues that “restoration of any area of the violation, or any mitigation in the form of injunctive relief to remedy such violations (including
mitigation for the temporal loss of wetlands functions and values), does not constitute a
SEP.” Id. at 20.
141. As indicated above, EPA’s SEPs policies identify a wide variety of projects that
may qualify as SEPs. The 1998 Policy includes as a catchall category “other types of projects” that have environmental merit. Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24800.
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may take on new sanctionable commitments in agreeing to perform a SEP. The obvious question is, why would an alleged violator agree to perform such “beyond compliance” work and accept the
additional attendant liability risks. 142 This is work the violator is
not obligated to do, money it is not obligated to spend, and risks of
punishment it is not required to accept.
The intuitive short answer is that EPA’s substantial penalty
authority gives it significant leverage to negotiate SEPs, since EPA
has indicated its willingness to reduce a penalty for a SEP. EPA
indicates in the 1998 SEPs Policy that
Evidence of a violator’s commitment and ability to
perform a SEP is also a relevant factor for EPA to
consider in establishing an appropriate settlement
penalty. All else being equal, the final settlement
penalty will be lower for a violator who agrees to
perform an acceptable SEP compared to the violator
who does not agree to perform a SEP. 143
The 1998 SEPs Policy spells out the extent to which EPA is
prepared to reduce a payable penalty in exchange for a commitment to perform a SEP. Ordinarily, a penalty would be the sum of
the economic benefit and gravity — in EPA’s words, “this sum is
the minimum amount that would be necessary to settle the case
without a SEP.” 144 The SEPs Policy provides that “in settlements
in which the defendant/respondent committed to conduct a SEP,
the final settlement penalty must equal or exceed either: a) The
economic benefit of noncompliance plus 10 percent of the gravity
component; or b) 25 percent of the gravity component only; whichever is greater.” 145 Thus, the SEPs Policy anticipates that EPA
staff may mitigate up to 90% of the gravity component of a penalty
in some cases, in exchange for a regulated party’s commitment to
perform a SEP. This is likely to be attractive to a violator, at least
in cases in which the gravity component of a penalty is substantial.
Two examples make this clear. Assume a situation in which
EPA would seek a penalty of $500,000, based on the Agency’s calculation of a $400,000 economic benefit and a $100,000 gravity
component. In this case, a violator would still have to pay a pen142. Another question involves the scope of EPA’s authority to encourage and agree to
“beyond compliance” projects as a factor EPA will consider when determining an appropriate penalty.
143. Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24797. See supra note 98 for other reasons
why a regulated party might be interested in performing a SEP.
144. Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24801.
145. Id.
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alty of $410,000, even if it committed to do a SEP. 146 Next assume
a situation in which the figures are reversed: the economic benefit
is $100,000 and the gravity is $400,000. Here, a violator conceivably could have its penalty reduced to $140,000. 147 In the latter
case, a violator has the ability to significantly reduce its penalty by
performing a SEP; SEPs in such cases are likely to hold particular
interest.
The SEPs Policy includes a number of other details relevant to
deciding how much a SEP should reduce a payable penalty. For
example, EPA considers the “quality of the SEP” to determine
what percentage of the SEP cost should be applied as mitigation
against the amount EPA would settle for, but for the SEP. 148 EPA
lists six factors to consider in evaluating the quality of SEPs. Two
are particularly relevant to ecosystem services. Indeed, in its description of each factor EPA specifically refers to protection and
restoration of ecosystems as reasons to provide maximum penalty
reduction in exchange for a regulated party’s implementation of a
project. First, EPA considers “benefits to the public or environment at large.” 149 EPA notes that SEPS will “perform well” on
this factor “to the extent they result in significant and . . . measurable progress in protecting and restoring ecosystems (including
wetlands and endangered species habitats).” 150 Second, EPA considers “innovativeness.” 151 It elaborates on this factor as follows:
SEPS which perform well on this factor will further
the development, implementation, or dissemination
of innovative processes, technologies, or methods
which more effectively: reduce the generation, release or disposal of pollutants; conserve natural resources; restore and protect ecosystems; protect endangered species; or promote compliance. 152

146. The violator would have to pay the entire economic benefit of $400,000, plus ten
percent of the gravity component of $100,000, for a total of $410,000.
147. The violator would have to pay the entire economic benefit of $100,000, plus ten
percent of the gravity component of $400,000, for a total of $140,000.
148. Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24802. The Policy defines the “SEP cost” to
be the “net present after-tax cost of the SEP.” The notion of “SEP cost” has been the subject
of considerable debate. See e.g., Kristl, supra note 96; Dana, supra note 96.
149. Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24802.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. The other four factors that EPA considers in assessing the quality of the SEP
and therefore the mitigation percentage the violator should receive, are environmental justice, community input, multimedia impacts, and pollution prevention. Id. SEP projects that
are of high quality because of the factors discussed in the text presumably will fare even
better if any of these other factors exists also.
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EPA indicates that the “better the performance of the SEP under
each of these factors, the higher the appropriate mitigation percentage.” 153
A second key feature of SEPs’ impact on penalty amounts is
that, with limited exceptions, the mitigation percentage may not
exceed eighty percent of the SEP cost. 154 Some commentators have
criticized this limitation on the ground that it makes rational violators less likely to agree to perform SEPs. 155 Even with this limitation, however, the possibility exists for significant penalty reduction in exchange for a SEP in some circumstances.
The bottom line in terms of SEPs’ potential for penalty mitigation is that, particularly for substantial penalties that include a
significant gravity component, EPA has significant leverage to encourage a regulated party to perform a SEP by offering in exchange a sizeable reduction in that component of the penalty. 156
4. Additional Implementation and Other Criteria
The SEPs Policy identifies several other key features for acceptable SEPs projects. Two features are likely to be especially
useful in terms of SEPs’ potential value as learning experiments.
As indicated above, there is a lot to learn about ecosystems and the
services they provide, and about the efficacy of different approaches in restoring or protecting such ecosystems and services.
The Policy encourages efforts to fill this gap. Further, it creates an
expectation that defendants will bear the cost of such efforts. The
Policy provides that “[t]o the extent feasible, defendant/respondents should be required to quantify the benefits associated with the project and provide EPA with a report setting forth
how the benefits were measured or estimated.” 157 This feature of a
SEPs project gives EPA the ability to encourage a violator to esti153. Id.
154. Id. In a 2000 memo, EPA’s Director of the Office of Regulatory Enforcement reinforced that the mitigation percentage should rarely exceed 80 percent of the SEP cost.
Memorandum from Eric V. Schaeffer, Dir., Office of Regulatory Enforcement, to Reg’l Counsels, Appropriate Penalty Mitigation Credit under the SEP Policy (Apr. 14, 2000), available
at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/seps/seppenmit-mem.pdf.
155. See e.g., Kristl, supra note 96, at 42 (suggesting that EPA could increase violators’
incentives to do SEPs by increasing the extent to which the Agency is prepared to forgive a
penalty in exchange for such a project, and recommending that EPA increase its mitigation
percentage to one hundred percent of a SEP’s cost). Edward Lloyd has concluded that EPA’s
approach to penalty mitigation is a “rational” one. See Lloyd, supra note 93, at 437.
156. EPA encourages its staff to “consider giving more credit to a defendant who
agrees to implement a SEP where there has been a commitment to include affected communities into the SEP selection.” EPA, Community Involvement Guidance, supra note 138, at
35887.
157. Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24803.
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mate the benefits the project produces in terms of ecosystems services. To the extent that EPA is able to pursue such analyses in
numerous settings throughout the country, involving a wide range
of ecosystems and services, this experience is likely to advance
learning about the value added from different types of projects in
terms of their impacts on the services that ecosystems provide and
the value of such services.
Similarly, the Policy requires violators to submit a final report
to EPA that documents completion of the SEP and SEP expenditures. 158 Thus, in addition to fostering learning about benefits to
ecosystems and the services they provide from different types of
projects, SEPs have the potential to foster learning about the costs
of such projects. This type of information, too, is likely to be helpful to EPA and others interested in exploring options for protecting, enhancing, and/or restoring ecosystems and the services they
provide.
In sum, EPA’s SEPs policy reflects EPA’s view that it may negotiate enforcement settlements that commit violators to implement projects that protect, enhance, and restore ecosystems and
the services they provide. Such projects logically may include projects that: 1) help to diagnose the extent of ecosystem and ecosystem services degradation; 2) identify and implement strategies to
protect and/or improve the ecosystem and its services; and 3)
monitor the effectiveness of the work done. The fact that EPA can
negotiate to have violators bear the responsibility and cost for undertaking this work adds to the potential value of SEPs as a tool to
advance understanding and protection of ecosystems and their
services in a world of limited government resources. 159
158. Id.
159. Bonorris et al., supra note 95, at 204 (making the same point with respect to state
SEP programs, noting that “because regulators often lack resources to pursue cutting edge
environmentally beneficial projects, state SEP programs provide a laboratory for innovation”). While EPA settlements must be implemented by defendants, Final SEPs Policy at
24,797-98, citizen-negotiated SEPs “are more often carried out by third parties, i.e., entities
that are not parties to the litigation.” Lloyd, supra note 93, at 433. Prof. Lloyd includes several examples of what he characterizes as successful use of SEPs in citizen suit settlements.
Lloyd, supra note 93, at 444-448 (for example, a settlement with the City of New York for
CWA violations that its sewage treatment plants committed, which led to creation of a $4
million Long Island Sound and Jamaica Bay Dissolved Oxygen Fund, which is available to
support land acquisition projects, habitat restoration, and water quality improvement projects or for studies benefiting Jamaica Bay or Long Island; and creation of the Quinnipiac
River Fund, as part of the settlement of a case that NRDC and the Connecticut Fund for the
Environment brought against Upjohn.
Upjohn agreed to make payments totaling
$1,800,000 and the settlement provided that the money would be used to improve the environmental quality of the Quinnipiac River and New Haven Harbor, the watersheds of these
waterbodies, and otherwise to benefit the environment of these resources. The illustrative,
but not exclusive, listing of acceptable environmental projects provided in the settlement
reads as follows: 1. studying the ecology of those waterbodies; 2. studying pollution of those
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C. Challenges and Possible Opportunities
The preceding discussion is intended to suggest that SEPs have
substantial promise as an enforcement tool to protect ecosystems
and the services they provide, and that those interested in advancing such protection would be well-served by learning more about
this tool and exploring its greater use. 160
The intriguing question about SEPs with which I end this section is whether there are ways to enhance the value of SEPs for
this purpose — are there steps EPA can take, for example, that are
likely to increase the number of SEPs that protect ecosystems and
the services they provide, or that increase the value such SEPs
provide. As noted above, the Annual Results data reflects that,
despite EPA’s rhetorical support for SEPs, the track record over
the past five years reflects stable (at best) use of SEPs since 2001,
rather than increasing use. 161 EPA’s own high-ranking enforcement officials have touted the promise of SEPs to move well beyond this level. 162
There are some likely inherent limits in the use of SEPs.
These include the additional transaction costs that regulated parties and the Agency each need to invest to negotiate a SEP. In
some cases these are undoubtedly significant. Thus, unless the
potential penalty is significant, it may not be worth the transaction costs to pursue a SEP. Further, there are likely cases in
which the regulated parties desire finality by concluding an enforcement matter, rather than agreeing to continuing obligations. 163
waterbodies; 3. researching methods of reducing pollution or otherwise improving the environmental health of those waterbodies; habitat restoration).
160. Again, I am not suggesting that SEPs are necessarily the most desirable way to
advance such goals (see, for example, Dana, supra note 96), or that their use does not raise
concerns. See e.g., Greve, supra note 97.
161. In his recent article, Kenneth Kristl claims to have made the first effort to analyze SEPs data from 1992-2005, and concludes that less than thirteen percent of settlements
annually in cases involving penalties during this period included SEPs, and that this percentage has been “steadily declining” since the mid-1990s. Kristl, supra note 96, at 2.
Kristl’s data, which provide numbers of SEPs finalized rather than dollar value of SEPs
negotiated, appear to show a highwater mark of 348 SEPs finalized in 1995. Beginning in
1998, the SEP numbers he reports are: 1) 1998: 221; 2) 1999: 197; 3) 2000: 193; 4) 2001: 164;
5) 2002: 157; 6) 2003: 150; 7) 2004: 213; and 8) 2005: 207. Kristl, supra note 96, at 22-23.
For a review of Kristl’s methodology, see Kristl, supra note 96. EPA itself has suggested
that there is a “tremendous opportunity” to increase negotiation of SEPs. Suarez, Expanding Use, supra note 103, at 1. Because SEPs are limited to enforcement settlements, it is
important to consider the numbers of SEPs negotiated in the context of the number of settlements finalized each year.
162. Suarez, Expanding Use, supra note 103.
163. Telephone Interview with Beth Cavalier and Melissa Raack, EPA SEPs Coordinators, in Washington, D.C. (July 10, 2006). EPA’s 1998 SEPs Policy indicates that EPA will
hold a violator liable for not completing a SEP satisfactorily and may impose additional
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Nevertheless, it seems worthwhile to explore whether there are
strategies that might operate to increase the use of SEPs given
their apparent promise. I offer below four possible approaches to
increase the use of SEPs, assuming this is the policy direction of
choice. None of these is intended to be a panacea — challenges
will remain, and there are policy reasons not to pursue some of
these approaches, in addition to reasons to consider them.
1. Revamping the process for proposing and approving SEPs,
and the substantive criteria for doing so. One obvious place to look
for possible opportunities for EPA to improve upon its SEPs performance is at the processes the agency uses to review and approve
SEPs, and at the substantive criteria it applies in doing so. The
current process does not appear seamless, in a number of respects.
One question is whether there are steps EPA can take that
would streamline or expedite the process for identifying SEPs and
then reaching agreement with a regulated party on an appropriate
SEP for a particular case. EPA’s policies place EPA staff in a reactive position with respect to SEPs. EPA may react to a regulated
party’s proposal to include a particular SEP in an enforcement settlement, but EPA staff may not propose a SEP themselves. 164 This
approach would seem to create the potential for a “we’ll know it
when we see it” scenario, a structure unlikely to inspire violators
to pursue creative possibilities for SEPs. 165 EPA reports that it
has made progress in educating regulated parties about the likely
parameters for acceptable SEPs, through creation of libraries of
SEPs projects and other steps. 166 Close review is needed, however,
penalties if this occurs. Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24802. Further, a violator may
not transfer this liability to the contractor or consultant that it retains to help it to implement a SEP, if it does so. Id. Interestingly, the Final SEPs Policy also provides that a violator should pay stipulated damages if it completes the SEP for less money than estimated.
Specifically, if the SEP costs less than ninety percent of the estimated cost, the violator
must pay between ten and twenty-five percent of the original mitigation awarded percent.
Id. at 24,803.
164. EPA currently expects a violator to propose a particular SEP, rather than do so
itself. Bonorris et al., supra note 95, at 213; Kristl, supra note 96, at 40; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Interim Revised EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects
Policy, 60 Fed. Reg. 24858 (May 10, 1995). Some states follow this approach while others do
not. Bonorris et al., supra note 95, at n.209 & 210. EPA officials informed me that EPA
may provide suggestions for a SEP if a violator asks. In addition, as noted above, EPA’s
website includes a list of potential projects, and EPA staff often direct alleged violators to
that website. EPA may also encourage an alleged violator to reach out to community
groups, who may have ideas for projects that could be considered as a SEP. E-mail from
Beth Cavalier, supra note 104.
165. Separation of powers concerns have motivated some governments to follow this
approach. The concern is that the administrator otherwise might implement “her own programmatic agenda under the guise of environmental enforcement.” See Bonorris et al., supra note 95, at 213.
166. See e.g., EPA, Community Involvement Guidance, supra note 138, at 35,887; Bonorris et al., supra note 95, at 213, 214 (regarding state initiatives of this sort and identifying

Spring, 2007]

THINKING INSIDE THE BOX

591

of the effectiveness of these initial steps, and of the opportunity to
improve upon these actions by doing more to inform regulated parties of the types of SEPs that would be acceptable in particular instances. Further, it would be worthwhile to explore the extent to
which putting EPA staff in a reactive position, rather than allowing them to identify SEPs they believe would be particularly useful, dampens EPA staffs’, and regulated parties’, enthusiasm for
SEPs. 167
A second issue, which concerns both process and substance, involves the extent to which EPA Headquarters has sent its staff a
“mixed message” in terms of the enthusiasm they should have in
pursuing SEPs. Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, in addition to
its expressions of encouragement to Regional staff to pursue SEPs,
EPA Headquarters also has issued a variety of memoranda that
would seem to have the opposite effect. In particular, EPA has
sent out what Regional staff would likely consider to be mixed signals by: 1) cautioning Regional staff that they should consult with
Headquarters personnel before approving a SEP if there is any
question concerning nexus; and 2) warning staff that they face
dismissal and sanctions if they approve a SEP inappropriately. 168
The practical consequence of this direction, given the apparent
considerable confusion that exists about the definition of nexus, 169
Delaware, Maine, and Illinois as having created SEP libraries); Suarez, Expanding Use,
supra note 103, at 1 (discussing the “piloting [of] a SEP library which will serve as a clearinghouse for possible SEPs.”).
167. There are procedural justice as well as distributive justice issues associated with
the identification, review, and approval of SEPs, and one question is whether the current
process is structured appropriately in terms of each of these sets of issues. See David L.
Markell, Understanding Citizen Perspective on Government Decision Making Processes as a
Way to Improve the Administrative State, 36 ENVTL. L. 651 (2006) for a review of procedural
and distributive justice.
168. Smith, Importance of the Nexus, supra note 123, at 2 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3302(d)).
The opening sentence provides that “[t]he purpose of this memo is to emphasize the importance of nexus in evaluating proposed [SEPs]” and it indicates that nexus is importance to
“avoid[ ] problems related to the Miscellaneous Receipts Act (MRA).” Id. at 1. EPA indicates
that the MRA requires that an EPA “official that receives money for the Government from
any source shall deposit the money in the Treasury . . . .” Id. at 2 (citing 31 U.S.C. §
3302(b)). The memorandum also notes that penalties for violating the MRA include removal
from office and personal liability for the amount of money misappropriated. Id. (citing 31
U.S.C. § 3302(d)). Professor Kristl takes the position that “elimination or substantial relaxation of the nexus requirement would create significant opportunities for increasing SEP
utilization.” Kristl, supra note 96, at 3. In Kristl’s view, the EPA/DOJ fixation on nexus as a
way to minimize EPA’s problematic legal authority to negotiate SEPs is misplaced; he argues that the “nexus requirement” is “not legally justified.” Id. at 3, 24.
169. EPA Headquarters noted in memos in 2002 and 2003 that there was considerable
confusion about the definition of nexus. In a 2003 memo EPA indicated that
several Regional and Headquarters offices raised questions about the
complexity of the existing SEP Policy. Specifically, we heard a number
of questions concerning how to define an appropriate nexus in certain
situations, and whether or not nexus can be waived in particular cir-
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is that Regional staff are likely to favor consultations in a substantial number of cases where SEPs might be in play.
EPA includes a list of “action items” in its June 2003 SEPs
Guidance that identify steps the Agency committed to take to effect improvements in the SEPs policy. The Agency, while reaffirming that nexus is “important to ensure compliance with the MRA
and . . . cannot be waived,” also indicated that EPA believed that
“there may be ways to simplify nexus, and still ensure that there
remains a connection between the underlying violation and the
SEP.” 170 While the Agency indicated in 2003 that it was “launching an effort to simplify the SEP Policy,” 171 in a recent article Professor Kenneth Kristl refers to EPA’s current guidance on nexus as
“a kind of ‘we know it when we see it’ platitude.” 172 He indicates
that, while “as of 2003, the agency knew that the nexus issue continued to create internal issues and that further clarification was
necessary-though so far it has not issued such a clarification.” 173
Professor Kristl continues: “In lieu of providing guidance on how to
deal with such circumstances [when nexus is not clear], the memorandum in effect takes the decision out of the hands of enforcement
personnel and puts it squarely within USEPA headquarters.” 174
cumstances . . . . Given this . . . we believe that there may be ways to
simplify nexus. . . .”
Suarez, Expanding Use, supra note 103, at 3. A 2002 EPA Memorandum similarly reflected
EPA Headquarters’ awareness that the nexus requirement was a source of confusion for
staff with the front lines capacity to negotiate SEPs, noting that Headquarters “continues to
receive many inquiries from enforcement staff regarding nexus in reviewing proposed
SEPs.” Smith, Importance of the Nexus, supra note 123, at 1.
170. Id. at 3.
171. Suarez, Expanding Use, supra note 103, at 2.
172. Kristl, supra note 96, at 240.
173. Id. at 245.
174. Id. at 241. I reviewed the entire list of SEPs Memoranda, Policies, and Guidance
to try to determine the approval process EPA uses. The only documents that I found that
are relevant are the April 1998 Final SEPs Policy itself, and a July 21, 1998 Memorandum
from Eric Schaeffer, then Director of EPA’s Office of Regulatory Enforcement, entitled Revised Approval Procedures for Supplemental Environmental Projects (July 21, 1998). The
July 21, 1998 memorandum indicates that SEPs that do not meet all of the legal guidelines
“may require Assistant Administrator approval” and will require a legal analysis from the
relevant staff explaining why the project is within EPA’s legal authority. Further, all projects that “may not fully comply” with the SEPs Policy “must be approved” by the OECA
Assistant Administrator. For “other” projects, the appropriate OECA official has approval
authority, with consultation by the Special Litigation and Projects Division, unless otherwise delegated. Otherwise, per the April 1998 Policy, “the authority of a government official
to approve a SEP is included in the official’s authority to settle an enforcement case and
thus, subject to the exceptions set forth here, no special approvals are required.” April 1998
Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 20 (section J). EPA officials advised me that the majority of SEPs do not need Headquarters approval. They indicated that only two categories of
SEPs need approval from the media-specific enforcement division director in Headquarters:
Compliance Promotion SEPs and Other SEPs and this is usually done quickly, and is not a
burdensome process. In addition, a settlement may need approval from the AA for OECA if
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His pessimistic conclusion is that EPA’s more recent memoranda
on SEPs “likely result[ ] in eliminating nexus as a useful policy
concept that can guide Agency staff or defendants seeking to conduct SEPs because it is difficult to tell just what is needed to satisfy the nexus requirement.” 175
Headquarters’ cautionary notes to the Regions about SEPs
seem to be worth investigating further for their possible impact on
regional interest in negotiating SEPs. These memos raise a conventional “efficacy of delegation” issue. 176 Part of the answer to
this question lies in the empirical data, which has not been compiled to my knowledge — questions concerning the number of cases
in which the Regions have negotiated SEPs without Headquarters
input compared to the number of cases in which the Regions
sought such input; the level of effort required to solicit and obtain
Headquarters “sign-off” on SEPs projects (e.g., the number of people to be contacted and the number of approvals required, the level
of effort needed to initiate and complete such contacts, the amount
and length of time it took to pursue this consultation process, etc.);
and the results of consultations with Headquarters (e.g., the number of cases in which SEPs were ultimately negotiated, the number
of situations in which SEPs were significantly modified, the number of cases in which SEPs fell through, etc.). Intuitively, it would
seem that the greater the transaction costs associated with obtaining “sign-off” or pursuing other consultations, and the less likely
the consultations are to pay dividends, the less likely a regional
official would be to bother. Thus, it seemingly would be worthwhile to try to assess the costs these signals engendered and, if the
costs appear to be significant, it would seem to be worthwhile to
consider alternative delegation structures that might yield a more
effective balancing of concerns about possible Regional missteps
with the desire to encourage the Regions to pursue SEPs.
Professor Kristl’s conclusion appears to be that, conceptually, it
is logical to assume that EPA’s cautionary notes have led EPA officials to play it safe and not be overly ambitious in pursuing possible SEPs:
Without clear guidance on what nexus really is,
Agency personnel and defendants are likely to ‘play
it safe’ and choose projects that have been approved
the minimum penalty requirement is not met; again, this is not usually a lengthy process.
E-mail from Beth Cavalier, supra note 104.
175. Kristl, supra note 96, at 19 (referring to Smith, Importance of the Nexus, supra
note 123).
176. See Markell, Slack, supra note 26, at 21.
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before or simply avoid SEPs altogether instead of
exploring new ways of utilizing SEPs that might in
fact be at the outer limits of nexus. 177
His further view is that the empirical data on SEPs support this
perspective. These data show a “steady decline” in the actual
number of SEPs and in “annual SEP utilization rates” after 1995,
which is when EPA issued an earlier version of its SEPs Policy
that included an “emphasis on nexus and lowered the mitigation
percentage ceiling from 100% to 80%.” 178 He contends that these
data “strongly suggest that a link between these policy changes
and the SEP utilization declines is more than simply coincidental.” 179
EPA officials from whom I sought input offered a different perspective:
It is not accurate to look at the numbers of SEPs
without also considering the number of enforcement
cases concluded each year, as SEPs cannot occur in
the absence of an enforcement action. The number
of enforcement actions concluded each year varies.
The percentage of settlements each year that include
a SEP has remained constant at approximately 910% over the past several years. The data does not
support the conclusion that there has been a decline
in the inclusion of SEPs in settlements. 180
In either case—a decline in SEPs as Kristl suggests, or a relatively stable level of use, as EPA contends—the type of datagathering effort I suggest above might yield insights about why
SEPs use has not increased, despite Headquarters encouragement
177. Kristl, supra note 96, at 19.
178. Id. at 23-24.
179. Id. at 24. Kristl suggests that relaxing or eliminating nexus requirements would
enable EPA to approve a wider variety of SEP projects. He suggests that the nexus requirement creates limits on aggregation of SEPs based on factors such as geography and
time that, if relaxed, would create a “more hospitable environment for SEPs and the benefits they can produce. . . .” Id. at 36. The Hastings Report, in contrast, concluded that legal
doctrine supports a nexus requirement and recommends that states include a variant of
nexus in their policies. Bonorris et al., supra note 95, at 188. The Hastings Report also indicates that: “Most state environmental protection agencies find themselves in the same position as EPA, fashioning settlements not expressly authorized by their legislatures. PLRI
has uncovered no state court case finding that a state environmental agency overstepped its
statutory authority in implementing SEPs.” Id. at 195. The Hastings Report also indicates
that “PLRI research indicates that no court has ever invalidated an EPA-approved settlement with a SEP.” Id. at 196.
180. E-mail from Beth Cavalier, supra note 104.
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to negotiate SEPs and outsider predictions that such increases
were likely to occur.
One fix to at least some of these issues that would likely increase SEPs use significantly would be for Congress specifically to
empower EPA to negotiate SEPs. EPA has developed many of the
administrative constraints it has created for SEPs because of concerns about the agency’s legal authority to pursue SEPs. 181 Clear
Congressional endorsement for SEPs would alleviate these concerns and, depending on Congress’s direction, might be a significant inducement for more aggressive agency pursuit of such projects. 182
2. Revising the incentives for regulated parties to agree to conduct SEPs. One way to increase regulated parties’ incentives to
pursue SEPs is for EPA to increase the financial benefit violators
reap by doing so. One possibility in this arena is for EPA to reduce
penalties by one hundred percent of the cost of the SEP project,
rather than limit the reduction to eighty percent of the project’s
cost, as is currently the case. 183 In other words, rather than give a
violator at most a $0.80 reduction in penalty for a $1.00 SEP, EPA
should give the violator a full $1.00 reduction. Professor Kristl,
urging such a change in his recent article, criticizes the “clear ‘second rate’ status that dollars spent on SEPs suffer” under EPA’s
SEP policies. 184 He argues that this eighty percent limitation in
mitigation is “neither legally nor economically justified,” and that
“allowing dollar-for-dollar penalty reductions would create significant opportunities for increasing SEP utilization.” 185 Kristl contends that raising the mitigation percentage to one hundred percent (and abolishing nexus, as discussed above) are “simple, legally
justifiable steps that will unshackle SEPs and allow the maximum
environmental benefits possible.” 186 To date, EPA has concluded

181. Kristl, supra note 96, at 25-26.
182. Commentators have suggested that only the CAA specifically provides for SEPs.
Kristl, supra note 96, at 25 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7604(g)(2) which allows a court to order that
civil penalties be used in beneficial mitigation projects rather than be deposited in the U.S.
Treasury). See also Nicholas Targ et al., The Possibility of SEP Legislation and Lessons
from the Fifty States, TRENDS (ABA-SEER), July/August 2007, at 4.
183. EPA considers the after-tax cost of the SEP in order to prevent a violator from
benefiting twice. As a result, the defendant should not get economic value for doing a SEP
that should raise the value of a SEP dollar. Kristl, supra note 96, at 37. See also, Final
SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24801. Other possible reasons to discount SEP dollars include: 1) the possibility that a violator reaps a public relations benefit from a SEP; and 2)
SEPs have less deterrent effect than penalties. Kristl, supra note 96, at 37-38.
184. Kristl, supra note 96, at 36.
185. Id. at 3-4.
186. Id. at 4. As Kristl indicates, EPA’s 1991 SEP Policy allowed a penalty reduction
as high as one hundred percent of a SEP’s value. Id.
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that such a change may increase concerns about the MRA. 187
Unless the government revisits this issue and reaches a different
conclusion, a legislative fix might be needed to effect this change in
approach.
3. Revising EPA’s measures for evaluating enforcement performance to create greater incentives for Regional Staff to encourage SEPs. Other changes that might be effective in encouraging
SEPs go beyond the world of SEPs. One such change involves the
measures EPA uses to evaluate enforcement performance. EPA
traditionally has used “output” measures as one indicator of enforcement performance — e.g., the number of inspections conducted each year, or the number of cases brought in a particular
year. To the extent that EPA staff are evaluated based on these
sorts of “beans,” or activity measures, such measures seem to have
the potential to create disincentives for staff to pursue timeconsuming projects, including SEPs. This is not necessarily the
case, of course. An appropriately calibrated weighting system
might give a Regional official or office more credit for a timeconsuming project (like a SEP) than for a less time-consuming one
(such as a “simple” penalty case). The question is whether current
measures, and the weight attached to them, may create management-based disincentives to undertake particularly environmentally valuable work, including negotiating SEPs that yield especially useful results. Research into EPA’s current performance
measures would be helpful in determining the extent to which performance measures serve to discourage (or encourage) EPA staff to
pursue SEPs.
4. Expanding EPA’s administrative enforcement authority. A
final set of possible actions that might encourage SEPs would involve an expansion of EPA’s administrative enforcement authority.
EPA’s SEPs Coordinators indicate that most SEPs are negotiated
in the context of administrative rather than judicial settlements. 188
On the one hand, this is not surprising since EPA brings many
more administrative than judicial cases. 189 Further, steering a
proposed SEP through multiple agency bureaucracies may well
entail increased transaction costs. 190
On the other hand, because some of EPA’s statutes allow for
more limited penalties in the administrative setting than in judi187. E-Mail from Beth Cavalier, supra note 104.
188. Telephone Interview with Beth Cavalier and Melissa Raack, supra note 163.
189. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF FIN. OFFICER, FY 2005 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT (2005) available at http://www.epa.gov/ocfo/
finstatement/2005par/par05.pdf.
190. EPA and DOJ both typically would need to sign-off on a judicial settlement, while
only EPA would typically sign-off on an administrative settlement.
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cial enforcement, 191 there are a variety of reasons why one might
expect SEPs to be particularly promising in cases that EPA currently lacks jurisdiction to settle. Judicial cases are likely to be
the more significant cases that warrant higher penalties, and
therefore are more likely to involve environmental harm. Further,
the higher penalties available in judicial cases seemingly would
give EPA more leverage to reduce penalties in exchange for performance of a SEP.
One option is for Congress to increase EPA’s administrative
penalty authorities. Congress has made legislative changes of this
sort (increasing penalty authorities, including administrative penalties) as it has amended the major regulatory statutes over the
past twenty years. Congress initially did not provide administrative penalty authority in the Clean Water and Clean Air Acts, for
example. 192 It only created such authorities in later iterations of
these laws. 193 For the Clean Air Act, Congress first established
administrative penalty authority in its 1990 Amendments to that
Act. 194 One option is for Congress to adopt in the Clean Air and
Clean Water Acts its RCRA model, by eliminating the artificial
limits it has included in the former two statutes on administrative
penalties vis-à-vis civil penalties. 195
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Ecosystems provide enormously important services to our species, in addition to the non-anthropomorphic benefits they produce. 196 Yet, many knowledgeable scholars have complained that
we have failed to design systems of governance that recognize this
reality or devote sufficient attention to understanding or protecting the services ecosystems provide. The consequence is that we
191. The CWA and CAA each provides for higher penalties in judicial civil cases than
in administrative civil cases. CWA §§ 309(d), (g) (2006); CAA §§ 113(b), (d) (2006).
192. Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The Consequences of DOJ Control of Litigation on
Agencies’ Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1345, 1368-69 (2000).
193. CWA § 309(g) (2006); CAA § 113(d) (2006).
194. CAA § 113(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1) (2000); Christopher M. Wynn, Facing a
Hobson’s Choice? The Constitutionality of the EPA’s Administrative Compliance Order Enforcement Scheme under the Clean Air Act, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1879, 1892-93 (2005).
195. For discussions of the appropriateness of judicial and administrative penalties,
see David L. Markell, “Reinventing Government”: A Conceptual Framework for Evaluating
the Proposed Superfund Reform Act of 1994’s Approach to Intergovernmental Relations, 24
ENVTL. L. 1055 (1994); Herz & Devins, supra note 192, at 1368-69.
196. Ecosystems and other parts of our natural environment have value in ways other
than the services they provide to humans. Thus, a focus solely on such services risks under-valuing these natural resources and poses a challenge for those interested in preserving
such resources for other reasons. The question of how best to approach this challenge is a
critical one, but it is beyond the scope of this article.
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under-value these services quite substantially and, as a result, we
squander them in various ways.
In the world of ecosystems and the services they provide, ignorance is unlikely to be bliss. Instead, it is a recipe for ill-informed
market-place decisions and for ill-informed policy choices that lead
to under-protection of our natural environment. There are numerous strategies for learning more about the threats that human activity poses to ecosystems and their services and for enhancing
protection of such systems and restoration of systems that have
sustained harm. Market-based approaches offer considerable
promise, 197 as do new or refined regulatory regimes. In this effort
to consider these questions in the context of regulatory enforcement, my tentative conclusion is that, at both the conceptual level
and in the real world, enforcement has promise to serve as an effective tool to help us improve our understanding of ecosystems
and the services they provide, and to aid in protecting and restoring such ecosystems and services. In addition to suggesting some
possible regulatory fixes myself to advance the goal of more effective protection of ecosystems and the services they provide, this
article is intended to serve as a challenge to regulatory aficionados
and experts in various types of ecosystems to consider how best to
structure and use these enforcement tools (and compliance promotion more generally) to achieve this important public policy objective.

197. See, e.g., Salzman, supra notes 3,6,11; PAUL A. U. ALI & KANAKO YANO, ECOFINANCE: THE LEGAL DESIGN AND REGULATION OF MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL INSTRUMENTS (2004).

